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Advanced automation functionalities present a viable alternative for improving the 
reliability level experienced by the customers in a electricity distribution network in 
addition to other methods. The requirements imposed on information and 
communication systems vary according to the chosen implementation of the automation 
features. The purpose of this study is to examine two functionalities and their 
requirements. Main objective is to clarify the main differences between alternative 
implementation options and to support the decision making process of the distribution 
system operator by a financial evaluation of the functionalities. 
The thesis consists of two parts. The chosen automation solutions, multi-level protection 
of medium voltage feeders and automated fault location, isolation and restoration, are 
introduced and examined in the first part. The basis for economic viability studies are 
also identified and discussed. In the second part, the financial aspect is explored through 
case analysis and with reference to current regulatory framework. 
Three fundamental operation alternatives are found for both automation functionalities. 
The requirements set for field equipment, communication network and control center IT 
systems range from similar to those of present ones to a demand of highly intelligent 
integrated system. Especially the scenarios with independent field agents utilizing 
distributed decision making provide challenges to system design. 
The effect on reliability of the network is assessed in typical rural and urban 
environment. Both of the features presented show a potential for improvement. The 
resulting customer outage cost benefits are notably greater in rural area, but some 
advantage is also gained in urban environment. However, the needed investments in 
urban network surpass the economic benefits. In rural network the implementation is 
profitable, provided that the current IT and communication systems are adequate or only 
part of the system require renewal. 
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Kehittyneen verkostoautomaation hyödyntäminen on varteenotettava vaihtoehto 
jakeluverkon luotettavuuden parantamiseksi muiden toimien lisäksi. Tietojärjestelmille 
ja tietoliikenneverkolle aiheutuvat vaatimukset riippuvat pitkälti valituttujen 
toiminnallisuuksien toteutustavasta. Tämän työn tarkoitus on tutkia kahta edistynyttä 
automaatiotoiminnallisuutta ja niiden asettamia vaatimuksia. Päätavoite on selvenetää 
tärkeimpiä eroavaisuuksia eri toteutusvaihtoehtojen välillä ja tukea jakeluverkkohaltijan 
päätöksentekoprosessia toiminnallisuuksien taloudellisella arvioinnilla. 
Työ koostuu kahdesta osasta. Moniportainen lähtöjen suojaus ja automaattinen vian 
etsintä, rajaus ja palautus esitellään ja niitä tarkastellaan ensimmäisessä osassa. 
Taloudellisen tarkastelun perusteteet tunnistetaan ja niiden vaikutusmekanismia 
pohditaan. Toisessa osassa taloudellista kannattavuutta tutkitaan case-tapausten 
analyysillä ja regulaattorin valvontamallin avulla. 
Kolme päätoimintamallia tunnistetaan molemmille automaatiosoveluksille. Vaatimukset 
verkon toimilaitteille, tietoliikenneverkolle ja käytön tietojärjestelmille vaihtelevat 
nykyisen kaltaisista älykkään integroidun järjestelmän tarpeeseen. Erityisesti mallit, 
joissa hyödynnetään itsenäisiä toimilaitteita hajautettuun päätöksentekoon aiheuttavat 
haasteita järjestelmäsuunnittelussa. 
Automaation luotettavuusvaikutuksia arvioidaan sekä tyypillisessä kaupunkialueen 
jakeluverkossa että maaseutuympäristössä. Molemmila esitellyillä toiminnallisuuksilla 
voidaan saavuttaa luotettavuusparannuksia. Parannus keskeytyksestä aiheutuviin 
haittakustannuksiin on huomattavasti suurempi maaseutuverkossa, mutta pienempiä 
hyötyjä on mahdollista saavuttaa myös kaupunkiympäristössä. Tarvittavat investoinnit 
ovat kuitenkin kaupunkialueella niin suuret, ettei automaation lisääminen ole 
taloudellisesti kannattavaa. Maaseutuverkossa toiminnallisuuksien käyttöönotto on 
kannattavaa, jos nykyisiä tietojärjestelmiä ja viestiverkkoa voidaan hyödyntää tai ne 
joudutaan uusimaan vain osittain.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the same time as society's reliance on electricity has increased rapidly, it has become 
clear that the electricity distribution in its current state does not meet the stricter 
requirements for quality and reliability of supply. Major winter storms of 2011 and 2013 
caused outages in broad areas leaving customers without electricity for days or even 
weeks (Pörssitiedote 5.1.2012; Häiriötiedote 13.12.2013).  
Distribution utilities have been obliged to improve the overall reliability of their 
networks with a recent additions in Electricity Market Act. After a 15 year transition 
period, customer's storm or snow related outage cannot last for more than 6 or 36 hours, 
depending on whether they live in area covered by a town plan or not. (L 1.9.2013/588) 
Renewal of old distribution network, mainly consisting of overhead lines, with a 
structurally more weather resistant technique will surely be the primary method to meet 
the strict legislative requirements. Depending on the operational environment of the 
utility, the overhead lines could be replaced with underground cables or covered 
conductors in conjunction with moving the line alongside a road. Effective fault repair 
organization is also crucial as technically fully fault free network is neither possible to 
achieve in real world nor financially viable scenario. 
Advanced network automation could be utilized to improve the reliability level during 
the transition period and to assist in the fault clearance process  especially in the event 
of major disturbances. The effect of fault could be limited efficiently to the smallest 
possible area with automated fault location and isolation system. Repair crews could be 
dispatched efficiently to the faulted location and power restored automatically to 
customers outside the faulted section. 
Another possible method would be addition of protection zones on a feeder. This would 
also limit the impact of a fault to a certain segment of the feeder. The fault location, 
isolation and restoration sequences could then be applied to further reduce the number 
of customer affected. 
Both of these solutions have multiple alternative implementations options. Depending 
on the chosen method, the requirements for field devices and secondary systems vary. 
Keys to successful implementation are integrated information systems and effective 
communication system between the subsystems. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the different technical solutions for described 
automation solutions and to identify the set requirement level for mainly 
1 INTRODUCTION 2 
communication but also other IT systems. This enables the comparison of found 
solutions and further, more specific studies. 
Another objective is to analyze the advanced automation scenarios from the asset 
management viewpoint. Main question is the viability of such investments against the 
regulatory framework currently in place. The effects of automation will be simulated 
with the help of available tools in network information system using real distribution 
network data. 
The subject of network automation could be easily broadened to include other 
automation functionalities or deepened within the chosen applications. Interesting 
related topics include the handling of distributed generation with multiple consecutive 
protection zones, utilization of current and voltage sensor data required for protection to 
other applications and adaptive relay setting values. However, the main focus of this 
thesis is on the two chosen functionalities and their evaluation and additional features 
are excluded from the thesis. 
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2. COMPARISON BETWEEN TRADITIONAL 
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK AND SMART GRID 
A distribution network forms the final part of the electric power delivery system 
between the generation and transmission of electricity and the end-user. On account of 
the principles which the different subsystems are constructed and operated, the 
distribution system determines the quality of the supply to a great extent. As discussed 
above, the requirements for uninterrupted, high quality supply of electricity have 
increased. Therefore a thorough examination of traditional distribution network is 
needed in order to detect the potential course of actions to improve reliability. 
Reliability has been one of the central focus areas in various ongoing research 
programs, that intent to develop solutions to existing challenges and rising needs in the 
future (Smart Grid R&D Multi-Year Program; Visions and Strategy for European 
Electricity Networks of the Future). Widely used term for a vision of such future 
network described in these programs is smart grid. Although details may vary, a smart 
grid is generally seen as flexible and intelligent grid, that enables energy distribution in 
an energy- and cost-efficient way. In this chapter certain key aspects of smart grids are 
introduced and compared with a traditional grid with emphasis on network automation.  
2.1 Traditional distribution network 
A distribution system consists of high voltage (HV) regional networks, high to medium 
voltage transforming substations or primary substations supplying medium voltage 
(MV) networks and further medium to low voltage secondary substations and low 
voltage (LV) networks. The HV networks are supplied by inter-regional transmission 
network. Most customers are connected to LV network, but large customers connect 
directly to the MV or HV networks. The basic structure of the distribution system is 
presented in Figure 2.1 with an arrow indicating the direction of power flow. (Lakervi & 
Holmes 2003) 
Differences in network design practices between distribution system operators (DSOs) 
have given rise to regional variance in system arrangements and technical solutions. 
However, the elemental features remain similar. The network is operated radially 
practically without exception due to simpler protection arrangements and better 
controllability. (Lakervi & Holmes 2003) 
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In rural areas the distribution network usually has a partially looped construction. 
Backup connections to MV feeders from the same or adjacent substation exist, but still 
long branches may remain prone to lengthy outages in the remote areas. MV lines are 
typically overhead lines with bare or insulated conductors and secondary substations 
pole-mounted. LV distribution is arranged with aerial bunched cables or underground 
cables. (Lakervi & Holmes, 2003) 
 
 
In urban areas the network is constructed in a more tightly looped arrangement with two 
or more alternative supply routes to almost every distribution substation. Underground 
Figure 2.1. A simplified structure of distribution system. The arrow indicates the
direction of power flow. 
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cable is primary choice for both MV and LV lines and secondary substations are pad-
mounted with steel or concrete enclosures or placed in the basement of buildings. 
(Lakervi & Holmes 2003) 
Other primary components relevant to this work are different sort of switchgear, such as 
circuit breakers and disconnectors. Switchgear is used to disconnect faulted equipment 
to prevent further damages, to allow maintenance or other work to be done on isolated 
part or to group circuits into a specific configuration for operational purposes. A circuit 
breaker is capable of breaking both load and fault current, whereas typical disconnector 
can only open or close a circuit with very limited current. Specific load-breaking 
disconnectors are available with higher current breaking capacity. (Lakervi & Holmes 
2003)In Finland MV feeders are typically protected with one circuit breaker placed at 
the beginning of the feeder at a substations feeder cubicles. Secondary circuit breakers 
along the feeders are rare. (Lakervi & Partanen 2008) 
In addition to primary components a distribution system comprises of various secondary 
components and systems. These include protective relays and auxiliary low voltage 
systems in primary substations, remote control and monitoring system, distribution 
management system and communications system for network operation and other 
extensive information systems, such as network information system and customer 
information system. (Lakervi & Partanen 2008) 
2.2 Smart grid 
Smart Grid (SG) is a general term describing a smarter future energy system and 
electricity grid. Different visions of SG exist, such as SmartGrids of European 
Technology Platform (ETP), Smart Grid Research & Development Program of U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) and Smart Grids and Energy Markets (SGEM), which is a 
Finnish research program coordinated by CLEEN Ltd . All see that the aging network 
doesn’t fulfill future requirements and demands for energy supply (Smart Grid R&D 
Multi-Year Program; Visions and Strategy for European Electricity Networks of the 
Future; Cluster for energy and enviroment). As the current grid approaches the end of 
its lifetime in the near future, it would be a logical opportunity to upgrade it to meet the 
modern standards.  
The key features associated with Smart Grid are flexibility to respond to changes and 
challenges, accessibility in terms of all network connection and especially distributed 
generation, improved reliability and finally cost efficiency through innovation,  
efficiency and competition. These high level objectives are thought to be achieved 
through a combined effect of several new or improved techniques and approaches. 
Among other things this means increasing penetration of distributed generation (DG), 
smart metering and demand response (DR), microgrids and increased level of 
automation. (Visions and Strategy for European Electricity Networks of the Future) 
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From the perspective of distribution networks a smarter grid means convergence with 
the transmission networks characteristics. Distributed generation connected to low or 
medium voltage distribution networks will introduce two way power flow to the system. 
Depending on the form of production the momentary power produced by the DG can 
fluctuate significantly causing the direction of the power flow to also change 
accordingly. The distribution system has to be able to adapt to these rapid changes 
constantly. In addition, compliance with the safety and voltage quality requirements has 
to be ensured at all times. Thus more active management of the network and increased 
level of information of the state of the grid are required along with advanced automation 
functionalities and developed information and communication systems to fulfill these 
requirements. (Strategic Research Agenda for Europe's Electricity Networks of the 
Future) 
2.3 Primary substation automation 
A primary substation is the linking part between the HV network and the MV network. 
It consists of a HV switchgear, one or several main transformers, a MV switchgear and 
an auxiliary low voltage system along with protection, control and communications 
systems. HV and MV switchgear can be either air- or gas-insulated and their busbar 
arrangements vary according to requirements for reliability, maintenance and 
operational reasons. (Lakervi & Partanen 2008) 
A substation is considered to be the single most important component of the distribution 
system. Its properties like location and size define the shape of the MV network, 
maximum length of the feeders, conductor dimensioning and  the backup connections to 
other substations. As a substation is a central and common point to the part of the 
distribution network it supplies, most of the protection and automation equipment has 
been gathered there. For example, the voltage level of the supplied area is regulated 
with the on-load tap changer located at the high voltage winding of the transformer. 
(Lakervi & Partanen 2008) 
Traditionally distribution automation has been seen as a system capable of remote 
monitoring, coordination and operation of network components. At substations this has 
meant  remote control of circuit breakers and acquisition of measurement values, 
various alarms and status indications. The control of the system has been centralized to 
the  network control center (NCC) and network operators with limited local functions 
such as protection of feeders, busbars and transformers. (Northcote-Green & Wilson 
2007) 
A conventional substation control system utilizes dedicated hardware devices for each 
function with excessive wiring between process level sensors and actuators, bay level 
control and protection relays, and station level functions. A remote terminal unit (RTU) 
collects necessary data and conveys it to the control center as well as connects the 
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operators commands to a particular device at the substation. In other words, the RTU 
acts as a gateway between the NCC and the substation. (Brand et al. 2003) 
The introduction of static and later numerical relays have led to the development of 
multi-functional intelligent electronic devices (IED). The integration of multiple 
functions into one device decreases the number of fault-prone equipment and the need 
for wiring thus improving reliability and reducing costs. In addition, the increasing 
processing power and memory capacity enables more intelligent functions. On the other 
hand, a more complex system requires careful system design and configuration. 
Additionally, the IED will become a more critical component and its reliable operation 
will have a significant effect on the performance of whole automation system. (Brand et 
al. 2003) 
Besides the development of IEDs, advancements in communication technology have 
also affected substation automation. Available bandwidths have risen from the few bits 
or kilobits per second of the past to a range of 10 Mbit/s to several Gigabit/s due to 
optical fibers, transport protocols such as PDH and SDH/SONET and Ethernet 
technologies. Together with new TCP/IP based communication protocols introduced in 
standards like IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850, advances in communications have 
enabled utilities to fully exploit all the functions of IEDs and new applications, such as 
remote monitoring and maintenance through a specific service bus. (Brand et al. 2003) 
Upcoming changes in distribution networks most likely lead to smarter substation 
automation systems. In (Heckel 2009; Valtari & Verho 2011) several aspects were 
identified as new requirements for a smart substation. These aspects include automatic 
fault location, isolation and restoration of supply to the healthy parts of the grid. 
Another key feature is the condition monitoring of the primary components and use of 
this information for Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). To enable data collection, 
processing and delivery forwards from the substation, open and standardized interfaces, 
such as IEC 61850, are needed in both process and utility level. All this has to be 
implemented within strict requirements for security and cost efficiency. (Heckel 2009; 
Valtari & Verho 2011) In addition, automatic adaptation of protection and monitoring 
functions according to changes in network topology or in response to changes in DG. A 
more advanced and accurate protection functions are also needed to meet the growing 
public requirements for reliably supply of electricity. (Valtari & Verho 2011) 
2.4 Secondary substation automation 
Automation in distribution networks  has typically been concentrated in primary 
substations. The level of automation along the MV feeders varies depending on country   
and utility (Heckel 2009). In Finland feeder level automation has been comprised 
mostly of remote controlled disconnectors (Lakervi & Partanen 2008). Remote 
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controlled disconnectors are located in key nodes as pole-mounted disconnector stations 
or integrated in ring main unit (RMU) of pad-mounted secondary substation.  
The level of secondary substation monitoring automation has been modest. Only some 
local measurements, such as peak current measurement, have been available. More 
versatile systems have not been economically feasible until recent technological 
development. Today several manufacturers provide automation systems especially 
designed for secondary substations. (Löf 2009) 
Implementation of automation system depends on DSOs choice of strategy, 
characteristics of the feeders and the substations, availability of communication, and 
desirable functions and performance of the automation system itself. According to 
(Heckel 2009) four different levels of automation could be identified. The most simple 
system consists only of automation devices without communication to the NCC. It 
performs predefined tasks, such as fault restoration sequences or voltage regulation, on 
its own. Second level system is capable of monitoring and transmitting measured values 
to a primary substation or the NCC. The communication is one way only and cannot 
receive any information or commands sent from the NCC. Third option combines 
control with above mentioned automation and monitoring. Two way communications 
enable comprehensive utilization of advanced functionalities. The highest level system 
adds protection functions to the third level automation system. (Heckel 2009) 
2.5 Advanced metering infrastructure 
One of the key features of future distribution networks in different Smart Grid visions 
has been the implementation and development of smart metering or AMI (Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure). AMI comprises of AMR meters (Automated Meter Reading), 
communication system and data collection and processing system (Keränen 2009). 
Usually AMI is seen as a measuring system of the consumption points. However, in a 
broader definition AMI encompasses measurements everywhere in the distribution 
network. This may be considered one of the first steps in bringing automation also to the 
low voltage network. In the past automation in LV network has not been economically 
justifiable compared to benefits gained by it. (Löf 2009) 
The integration of AMI and network operation system enables the introduction of 
various low voltage network management functions. For example, the possibility to use 
AMR meters to indicate faults in LV network is a significant improvement over the 
traditional situation, where indication is based on customer calls. Alarms of the 
existence and type of fault are provided to control center. When the status information 
of all the meters under certain secondary substation is linked to the topological network 
model the exact location of the fault can be found. (Järventausta et al. 2007) Meters may 
also include remotely controllable main switch and additional relay outputs for load 
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management. These features enable direct load control by customer service or control 
center and additionally customer tariff or power based load management. (Löf 2009) 
In addition, the AMR meters provide means to extensive power quality monitoring of 
customer service points. Reliable and comprehensive measurements collected over 
several years could be utilized in customer services, asset management and network 
operation. The newest generation of meters can measure and log a wide range of 
quantities related to power quality in addition to basic electrical quantities. This 
information could be used to deepen the knowledge of the state of the distribution 
network and thus improve the efficiency of the DSOs and the quality of service 
experienced by the customers. (Järventausta et al. 2007) 
2.6 Information and communication technology in electricity 
distribution 
Different information and communication systems have a great role in DSO's daily 
operations. Network operation relies highly on automation of network components and 
information systems built to monitor and control them. Asset management, network 
design and customer services all have their own systems with interfaces interlinking 
them. Data communication forms the backbone for other applications both in the office 
network and in the field communications. 
Role of ICT is growing in electricity distribution. New automation applications, 
integration of active resources, such as distributed generation and electric vehicles, and 
low voltage level management set new requirements for ICT solutions (Järventausta et 
al. 2010). Carefully executed system integration and efficient communication networks 
both in system and field level form the basis for this development.  
2.6.1 Utility data communications 
Utility data communications forms the backbone of network automation and control 
systems. It enables the monitoring and controlling of distribution network remotely 
from a centralized control room including network protection and measurement 
arrangements. In this concept the data communication usually refer to digital data  being 
transferred over digital and analogical links. (Strauss 2003) In this chapter the basic 
characteristics of data communication are introduced with focus mainly on 
communication between automated network components in substations or elsewhere in 
the distribution network and control center. 
Open system interconnection model (OSI) defined by the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) and presented in Figure 2.2 specifies the architecture of data 
communication network. It consists of seven sub-processes with specific services and 
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functions provided through protocols. Each sub-process or layer provides services to the 
higher layers. The sender AP1 gives the data to be transmitted to receiver AP2 to 
highest layer called application layer, which adds its own application header AH to the 
beginning of the data. Header contains necessary control information and information 
exchange destined to its peer entity at the same level in the AP2. The message is then 
transferred to the next lower level for further processing and another header is attached. 
Finally, the physical layer transmits the message over a communication media to the 
physical layer of the receiver. At the destination, the message is processed in reversed 
order starting from the physical level up to the application level and finally to the 
receiver AP2. (Hura & Singhal 2001) 
 
Figure 2.2. OSI model. (Hura & Singhal 2001) 
Different types of physical links can be roughly divided into wireless and wire 
communication. Wireless formats include radio modems and links, different cellular 
techniques and satellite connections.  Wire connections include optical fibers, copper 
lines, coaxial cables or power lines (power line carrier, PLC). (Northcote-Green & 
Wilson 2007) Physical link can be owned by the utility or leased from specific supplier. 
It can be dedicated only to utilities use or even exploit public network. 
Physical link impacts several critical characteristics of the communication system. As 
its main task physical layer provides a physical connection between transmitting and 
receiving nodes, and transmission of data units in serial or parallel mode. Transmission 
media, transmitter and receiver define the transmission speed, efficiency and capacity of 
the channel. They also affect other aspects of the quality of service, such as error rate, 
signal distortion and noise. (Hura & Singhal 2001) 
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Communication network topology has three physical and logical alternatives, namely 
star, ring and bus. In a star topology all of the remote stations are connected to a single 
master and communicate through it. Therefore star is vulnerable to failure of the master 
node. On the other hand, maintenance, fault location and repair, and adding or removing 
remote stations is easy. (Strauss 2003) 
In ring topology all of the nodes are connected to two adjacent nodes to form a ring. 
Messages travel along the ring through each node until a receiving node is found. Nodes 
can also communicate directly with each other and a master node is not necessarily 
needed. On the downside, failure of a single node disrupts the operation of the whole 
ring, fault isolation is harder as well as adding and removing nodes. (Strauss 2003) 
In bus topology nodes are connected to a communication channel known as a bus. Each 
node monitors messages travelling in the bus and accepts those sent to it. Bus is the 
most flexible topology in terms of configuration, reliability and scalability. On the other 
hand, troubleshooting is difficult as any part of the bus may fail, heavy traffic may 
disrupt communications and messages may be lost or caught by a wrong node. (Strauss 
2003) 
Above the physical layer data link layer is responsible for the integrity of the data 
transferred providing for example protocols for error recovery. Data link layer is 
divided into two sub-layers called media access control (MAC) and logical link control 
(LLC). (Hura & Singhal 2001) MAC is responsible for method of media access and has 
thereby essential part in the communications. Four different main methods are applied 
to media access control. 
First alternative is polling, where a slave station may send data only when requested by 
a master station in a certain order. In a more refined version of polling only exceptions 
or changes are transferred. Both version share the advantages of reliability and 
predictability rising from the systems simplicity. Main disadvantage is the inefficient 
use of available connection and slow response rates. (Strauss 2003) 
Second alternative is called time-division-multiplex media access (TDM), in which each 
node has been given a timeslot for sending and receiving data. TDM has similar 
advantages and disadvantages as polling, but in addition the configuration of the 
network is more complex. (Strauss 2003) 
Third possible method is token pass media access, where a token is circulated in ring or 
bus type network. Any node may take the passing token to use the communication 
network. Token is released to circulation again, when the transmission is completed. 
This configuration results in a more efficient use of network, faster peer-to-peer 
communication and more flexible modification of data transfer requirements. A central 
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controller is still needed, configuration is complex and exact response times cannot be 
predicted anymore. (Strauss 2003) 
Fourth type of media access control is called carrier sense multiple access with collision 
detection (CSMA/CD). In principle, a node listens to communication bus and sends its 
messages, once the bus is idle. If another node happens to send a message at the same 
time and a collision happens, both of the nodes stop transmitting and try again after 
some random time interval. CSMA/CD is a very efficient and fast choice for access 
control, but demands special attention on data collision detection and network 
configuration. (Strauss 2003) 
Media access control and other rules for communication are compiled into 
communication protocols. A communication protocol addresses the format of messages 
and methods for transmitting and receiving  them. Some common protocols include IEC 
60870-5, Modbus, DNP 3.0 and new IEC 61850, which aims to become a universal 
communication standard for power system automation (Strauss 2003). 
Current communication network in Caruna represents a typical traditional field 
communication solution. It has been designed solely for remote control of substations 
and disconnector stations. Network has been composed of several communication 
networks of acquired regional distribution companies. A fiber optics core network 
connects regional access points to control center. Regional trunk connections consists 
mostly of digital or analog radio links between substations with layered star topology, 
but copper cables and fibers can also be found in some regions. Last-mile connections 
from substations to disconnector station have been mainly executed with radio modems. 
Communications take place by serial communication with polling using several 
protocols. (Koli, Petteri; Vähälä Antti 2012) 
In such a network transmission bit rates remain at a quite low levels and response times 
can be long due to the technique used and polling nature of the network. Long response 
times cause especially problems in major disturbance situations when the network is in 
high load and needed the most. Network is also vulnerable to faults as no reserve 
connections exists. In worst case a single fault may cause whole area to lose connection 
to control center and fault is only noticed, when the connection is needed. In addition, 
the fact that some of the links are leased from external contractors and the wide variety 
of different techniques and equipment used further complicate fault repairs and 
maintenance. 
Clearly the current communication network doesn't meet future needs. Rising reliability 
requirements denote also increase in network automation and set new demands for data 
communications. In normal situation the two most important requirements are 
bandwidth of the channel and latency (Laverty et al. 2010; Sauter & Lobashov 2011). 
Other main concerns of interest are reliability and availability of the system, 
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communication security, scalability and Quality of Service management (Sauter & 
Lobashov 2011).  
Reliability, availability and capacity of the system have a larger role in a major 
disturbance situation, when the communication network is stressed and needed the 
most. For instance, public communication network utilized as part of DSO's field 
communications may suffer from large electricity distribution outages. If base stations 
are not equipped with backup batteries or the batteries drain before electricity is 
restored, communication network coverage may suffer or even be completely lost as 
demonstrated in (Horsmanheimo). This leads to longer repair times as network 
automation cannot be utilized and field crew communication is disrupted. Remaining 
base stations are likely to be congested by increased number of emergency calls and 
inquiries. Thus the simulation results are somewhat optimistic compared to real-life 
situation. (Horsmanheimo) This should be considered in planning of utility 
communications network and coordinated with communication network operator. 
2.6.2 Remote terminal unit 
Remote terminal unit (RTU) enables communication between a central system and field 
instruments at the local process level. The earliest RTUs only converted the information 
from the field instruments to language supported by the central system and transmitted 
it to the master system. RTUs also received messages from the master and converted 
them to the field instruments. Over time RTUs have become more intelligent and have 
adopted some of the control functionalities of the central system to the local level. 
(Strauss 2003) 
In addition to the basic features of the first RTUs, a modern version can also store, filter 
and process the acquired data. These aspects distinguish a basic RTU, that only acts as a 
gateway between process and system level, from the more advanced ones and enable 
more sophisticated functionalities to be performed.  Local processing capacity 
contribute for its own part to extended control of the whole distribution network, as it 
increases the performance of the system by decreasing the dependence on the central 
system. (Northcote-Green & Wilson 2007) 
As a substation RTU required extensive wiring to connect it to all individual field 
equipment, thus increasing the cost of a substation, a small RTU was developed. This 
small RTU could be installed closer to the switchgear and the field equipment to save 
wiring costs. At first small RTUs communicated with the substations master RTU, but 
after the next step of development they were able to communicate directly with the 
central system. Small RTU has been since renamed as a bay controller after its main 
purpose. (Strauss 2003) 
2 COMPARISON BETWEEN TRADITIONAL DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
AND SMART GRID 14 
2.6.3 Intelligent electronic device 
Intelligent electronic device (IED) is a term that could be used to describe any electronic 
device capable of local intelligence. In this thesis a more relevant definition is adopted. 
According to (Strauss 2003), IED is “a device that has versatile protection functions, 
advanced local control intelligence, monitoring abilities and the capability of extensive 
communications directly to a SCADA system.” 
Development of IEDs began shortly after the introduction of intelligent microprocessor- 
based relays. Communication capabilities were added first to enable remote 
programming of the relays. Later the benefits of data retrieval were understood and 
communications developed further. In the next step the advanced control functions of 
bay controller and the protections functions of intelligent relay were incorporated into 
same physical device named as IED. (Strauss 2003) 
Current IEDs master versatile protection, control, monitoring, metering and 
communications functions. A typical IED offers directional and non-directional 
overcurrent and earth fault protection, phase discontinuity protection, and over- and 
under-voltage protections as basic feeder protection. Control functions include local and 
remote control of several switching components, fully programmable control sequences 
and bay level interlocking to prevent unnecessary tripping. Monitoring functions enable 
supervision of the IED itself and its trip circuit, condition monitoring for the circuit 
breaker, event recording and other monitoring functions, such as temperature 
monitoring. IEDs can also measure three-phase currents and voltages, neutral current, 
frequency, active and reactive power, energy and harmonics. In addition, IEDs offer 
transient disturbance recorders. (Strauss 2003) 
2.6.4 SCADA 
SCADA stands for supervisory control and data acquisition. It is the central system used 
by network control center to acquire information of the state of the distribution network, 
transfer the data to the SCADA master, and process, store and display it according to 
utilities demands. As the other main task SCADA is used to centrally control the 
remotely controllable components of the grid. (Strauss 2003) 
SCADA was originally used as a central control system for industrial plants. Today it is 
used widely to control infrastructure and facility processes, such as electrical 
transmission and distribution, water treatment or air conditioning systems. (Strauss 
2003) 
SCADA system consists of master station and RTUs or other devices capable of 
advanced communications, such as modern IEDs. SCADA master station includes the  
hardware and software needed to display real-time data acquired from the network, 
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store this received data, activate alarms and display reports of events and to provide an 
interface for an operator controlling the network. In addition, communications  
capability and connections between the master station and the other connected devices 
are needed. (Strauss 2003) 
2.6.5 Distribution management system 
Distribution management system (DMS) is a support system for network operations. 
DMS combines the geographical and structural information of the network with status 
and measurement information from SCADA. It displays the current switching state and 
can be used to plan and simulate upcoming switching sequences or analyze the effects 
of certain faults and status of the network at given time. (Northcote-Green & Wilson 
2007) 
Other main task of DMS is outage management and reporting. Outage management 
encompasses fault notification, location and repair as well as switching operations to 
isolate fault and restore supply to customers. In order to  enable outage reporting for 
DSO's own needs and to authorities, statistics of the fault reason, location, length and 
affected customers has to be reported as part of the outage management process. 
(Northcote-Green & Wilson 2007) 
2.6.6 Network information system 
Network information system (NIS) contains all of the technical and location information 
of the network components. Its main functions include data and documentation 
management of the current and planned networks. In addition, various specific functions 
for network design, asset management and maintenance purposes are part of NIS. 
(Lakervi & Partanen 2008) 
NIS is a central system for a DSO. Interfaces to customer information system, DMS, 
SCADA, project management system and other systems ensure the efficient use of 
available data and enable basic functionalities of NIS, such as load flow calculation and 
short circuit or earth fault calculations. (Lakervi & Partanen 2008) 
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3. FINNISH REGULATORY MODEL 
Electricity distribution in Finland is regulated by Energy Authority (EA, formerly 
Energy Market Authority, EMA). Because of the capital-intensive nature of distribution 
business, DSO's typically operate a natural local monopoly. In absence of the normal 
market forces generated by rivalling companies, economic regulation has to be 
established to ensure the effectiveness of the industry. This is the case in most of the 
European countries, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, India and some Latin American 
countries (Jamasb & Pollit 2001). 
Finnish regulation model is based on retrospective rate-of-return (ROR) regulation with 
several incentives in place (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan). Regulatory period is four 
years and the current 2012-2015 period is the third one. The principles and key methods 
are presented in Figure 3.1. 
On the left-hand side of the Figure 3.1 the balance sheet is adjusted to determine the 
reasonable return. The calculation is started with determination of the replacement value 
of network (RV) based on the number of network components and unit price list 
provided by the regulator. Present value (PV) is then calculated with the help of 
component specific expected lifetime and average age data from the RV. The DSO may 
choose the lifetime from a predefined range provided by the EA. Other adjusted capital 
invested in the network is calculated and added to PV to gain the adjusted invested 
capital. The reasonable return is calculated by multiplying this by real reasonable rate of 
return, which is  based on weighted average cost of capital (WACC) calculated using 
fixed capital structure of 30/70 (interest-bearing debt/equity) and interest of Finnish 10-
year bond as the greatest influencing factor. (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
The calculation of actual adjusted profit is presented on the right hand side of Figure 
3.1. Calculation starts from the actual operating profit, upon which the change in 
refundable and transferable connection charges, paid network rents and depreciations on 
goodwill are added. Then the outcomes of investment, quality, efficiency, innovation 
and security of supply incentives are deducted as well as other adjustments. The result 
of this is the actual adjusted profit, which is compared with the reasonable return 
calculated earlier to determine the deficit or surplus of the DSO. (Sähkön 
jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
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Figure 3.1. The principle of calculating reasonable return and key methods of 
regulation. Adopted from (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
3.1 Quality incentive 
The purpose of quality incentive is to encourage the DSO's to maintain and develop 
their networks in a reliable manner. Incentive is based on annual customer outage costs 
(COC) derived from collected outage statistics and unit costs. The outage statistics 
comprise of number and duration of both unexpected and planned sustained 
Present value of electricity network
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interruptions as well as number of high-speed automatic reclosings (HSAR) and time-
delayed automatic reclosings (DAR) of momentary interruptions. The unit costs are 
based on a study conducted in 2004-2005 (Silvast et al. 2005). The unit costs in the 
2005 monetary value are presented in Table 3.1. (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
Table 3.1. The unit prices for customer outage cost calculation in the 2005 monetary 
value. (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
Unexpected outage Planned outage 
Time-delayed 
autorecloser 
High-speed 
autorecloser 
ce,u cw,u he,p hw,p cdar chsar 
€/kWh €/kW €/kWh €/kW €/kW €/kW 
11,0 1,1 6,8 0,5 1,1 0,55
 
The COC in year t in the value of money in year k is calculated as 
 
ܥܱܥ௞,௧ ൌ ൫ܱ ௨ܶ,௧ ൈ ܿ௘,௨ ൅ ܱ ௨ܰ,௧ ൈ ܿ௪,௨ ൅ ܱ ௣ܶ,௧ ൈ ܿ௪,௣ ൅ ܱ ௣ܰ,௧ ൈ ܿ௪,௣ ൅ ܦܣܴ௧
ൈ ܿௗ௔௥ ൅ ܪܵܣܴ௧ ൈ ܿ௛௦௔௥൯ ൈ ൬ ௧ܹ௧ܶ ൰ ൈ ൬
ܥܲܫ௞ିଵ
ܥܲܫଶ଴଴ସ൰ 
(3.1) 
where 
COCk,t = customer outage cost in year t in the value of year k 
OTu,t = customer's average annual outage time weighted by annual energies, 
caused by unexpected outages in the 1-70 kV network in the year t, hours 
ce,u = unit cost for unexpected outage duration [€/kWh] 
ONu,t = customer’s average annual number of outages weighted by annual 
energies, caused by unexpected outages in the 1–70 kV network in year t, 
numbers 
ce,u = unit cost for unexpected outages [€/kW]  
OTp,t = customer’s average annual outage time weighted by annual energies, 
caused by planned outages in the 1–70 kV network in year t, hours 
ce,p = unit cost for planned outage duration [€/kWh] 
ONp,t = customer’s average annual number of outages weighted by annual 
energies, caused by planned outages in the 1–70 kV network in year t, 
numbers 
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cw,p = unit cost for planned outage [€/kW] 
DARt = customer’s average annual outage number weighted by annual energies, 
caused by time-delayed autoreclosers in the 1–70 kV network in year t, 
numbers 
cdar = unit cost for time delayed autoreclosings [€/kW] 
HSARt = customer’s average annual outage number weighted by annual energies, 
caused by high-speed autoreclosers in the 1–70 kV network in year t, 
numbers 
chsar = unit cost for high-speed autoreclosings [€/kW] 
Wt = annual distributed energy of the DSO [kWh] 
Tt = number of hours in year t 
CPIk-1 = consumer price index in year k-1 
CPI2004 = consumer price index in year 2004 
The calculated actual COC is then compared with a reference level gained from the 
historical performance of the DSO. The reference COC is calculated as 
ܥܱܥ௥௘௙,௞ ൌ
∑ ቆܥܱܥ௧,௞ ൈ ቀௐೖௐ೟ቁቇ
ଶ଴ଵ଴௧ୀଶ଴଴ହ
6  
(3.2) 
where 
COCref,k = reference customer outage cost for year k 
COCt,k = actual customer outage cost in year t in value of year k 
Wk = annual supplied energy in year k [kWh/a] 
Wt = annual supplied energy in year t [kWh/a] 
The actual quality incentive is then calculated as difference between COCref and COC 
ܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ	݅݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁ ൌ 0,5 ൈ ൫ܥܱܥ௥௘௙ െ ܥܱܥ൯ (3.3) 
Only half of the difference is taken into account. In addition, the incentive is limited to a 
maximum of 20 % of the reasonable return on capital. As the incentive is symmetrical, 
end result may be either positive or negative. (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
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3.2 Investment incentive 
The purpose of investment incentive is to encourage the DSO's to invest adequately to 
their networks in order to at least maintain the condition level of the network. The 
method used to secure a sufficient income level to enable this considers straight-line 
depreciations  calculated from the replacement values and the lifetimes of components. 
Straight-line depreciation for network component i is calculated as 
ܦ݁݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊௧,௜ ൌ ܴ ௧ܸ,௜ܮ݂݅݁ݐ݅݉݁௜ (3.4) 
where 
Depreciationt,i = straight-line depreciation of the network component i in year t 
RVt,I I =  repurchase value of network component i in the year t 
Lifetimei  = techno-economic lifetime of network component i 
The component-specific depreciations constitute the straight-line depreciation for the 
entire distribution network. In the calculation of the incentive, the book value of 
planned depreciations are deducted from the straight-line depreciation for the whole 
network. The incentive is taken into account in the adjustment of profit and loss. 
(Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
The investment incentive has also another purpose. The EA uses it to monitor the 
proportion of straight-line depreciation to actual replacement investments in the 
network. The logic is that as the depreciations are meant to cover the cost of component 
replacement at the end of its lifetime, DSO should make as much replacement 
investments as the calculated depreciations are. If less investments are made, a 
replacement investment deficit arises. (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
3.3 Efficiency incentive 
Efficiency benchmarking has an important role in the regulation model. It prompts 
DSO's to improve their performance in absence of normal market forces of rivaling 
companies. Efficiency incentive has similar structure as quality incentive. DSO's actual 
efficiency is compared with established DSO-specific target level. The target efficiency 
includes both general and enterprise-specific efficiency targets. General targets 
describes the improvement potential of the entire sector, whereas enterprise-specific 
targets compares the DSO with the most efficient companies. (Sähkön 
jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
The efficiency incentive for year t is calculated as 
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ܧ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕ ݅݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁௧ ൌ ܱܵܶܶܧܺ௧ െ ܱܶܶܧܺ௧ (3.5) 
where 
STOTEXt = reference level for efficiency costs in year t 
TOTEXt = actual efficiency costs in year t 
The actual total efficiency cost is calculated as 
ܱܶܶܧܺ௧ ൌ ܱܲܧܺ௧ ൅ 0,5 ൈ ܥܱܥ௧ (3.6) 
where 
OPEXt = actual operational costs in year t 
COCt = actual customer outage costs in year t 
The reference for efficiency costs is determined by StoNED method (Stochastic Non-
smooth Envelopment of Data). The main inputs consist of the DSO-specific efficiency 
requirement, the general efficiency requirement, estimated efficiency costs and medium 
voltage network cabling rate. The general efficiency requirement common for all DSOs 
is 2,06 % per year. The reference level is calculated as 
ܱܵܶܶܧܺ௧ ൌ ൬ ܥܲܫ௧ିଵܥܲܫଶ଴଴ଽ൰ ൈ ሺ1 െ ܺሻ
௧ିଶ଴଴ଽ ൈ ܥመሺݕ௧, ݖ௧ሻ (3.7) 
where 
STOTEXt = reference level in year t 
CPIt-1 = consumer price index in year t-1 
CPI2009 = consumer price index in year 2009 
X = DSO-specific efficiency target 
ܥመሺݕ௧, ݖ௧ሻ = cost frontier of DSOs in 2019, in the 2009 price level 
t = calculation year 
yt = vector of output variables in year t 
zt = degree of cabling in the medium voltage network (1-70 kV) in 
year t 
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Output variables used for calculation of cost frontier Ĉ are the volume of supplied 
energy, the total length of network and the number of customers. The different 
operation environment of DSO is taken into account in environment variable zt. Ĉ is 
calculated as 
Ĉሺݕ௧, ݖ௧ሻ ൌ Ĉሺݕ௧ሻ ൈ expሺߜݖ௧ሻ (3.8) 
where 
yt = vector of output variables in year t 
zt = degree of cabling in the medium voltage network (1-70 kV) in 
year t 
δ = slope of degree of cabling in the medium voltage network (1-70 
kV) = 0,585239980789296 
 DSO-specific efficiency target Xi is calculated as 
ܺ ൌ 1 െ √ܶܮఴ ൈ ሺ1 െ 2,06 %ሻ (3.9) 
 where 
X = DSO-specific efficiency target 
TL = DSO-specific efficiency coefficient, estimated with the StoNED 
method 
(1-2,06 %) = the need to improve the efficiency of costs in accordance with the 
general efficiency target 
The DSO-specific efficiency coefficient TL is calculated as 
ܶܮ ൌ ܱܶܶܧܱܺܶܶܧܺଶ଴଴ହିଶ଴ଵ଴ (3.10)
where 
ܱܶܶܧܺ = the reference for average efficiency cost in 2005-2010 
TOTEX2005-2010 = the average efficiency cost in 2005-2010, in the 2010 price level 
The TOTEX  reference level is calculated as 
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ܱܶܶܧܺ ൌ ܥሺݕሻ ൈ ݁ݔ݌ሺߜݖ ൅ ߝሻ ൌ ܥሺݕሻ ൈ expሺߜݖ ൅ ݑ ൅ ݒሻ (3.11)
where 
ܱܶܶܧܺ = the reference for average efficiency cost in 2005-2010 
C = estimated cost function, the frontier of DSOs' reasonable 
efficiency costs 
 ݕ = average vector of output variables in 2005-2010 
δ = parameter describing the average cost impact of the MV cabling 
degree 
ݖ = average MV cabling degree in 2005-2010 
ε = combined error term 
u = average inefficiency term in 2005-2010 
v = random error term 
 
 The average actual TOTEX2005-2010 is calculated as 
ܱܶܶܧܺଶ଴଴ହିଶ଴ଵ଴ ൌ
∑ ቆሺܱܲܧܺ௧ ൅ 0,5 ൈ ܥܱܥ௧ሻ ൈ ஼௉ூమబభబ஼௉ூ೟ ቇ
ଶ଴ଵ଴௧ୀଶ଴଴ହ
6  
(3.12)
 where 
TOTEX2005-2010 = the average efficiency cost in 2005-2010, in the 2010 price level 
OPEXt = actual operational costs in year t 
COCt = customer outage costs in year t 
CPI2010 = consumer price index in year 2010 
CPIt = consumer price index in year t 
3.4 Other incentives 
Other incentives in the regulation model include innovation and security of supply 
incentives. The innovation incentive incorporates research and development costs and 
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costs of remote meter reading for under 63 A connections. The reason for including 
costs for remote meters lies in the change in legislation and is compensated only once.  
Research and development costs accepted in the incentive have a maximum of half a per 
cent of the DSO's turnover. As of extra costs caused by remote meter reading, regulator 
accepts five euros per AMM meter in hourly metering. (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
The security of supply incentive is a new incentive added in the middle of the third 
regulation period. It applies only to the years 2014 and 2015. As the new Electricity 
Market Act came into act, the incentive was added to compensate for costs of renewing 
network prior to the end of its planned lifetime. The incentive includes the remaining 
NPV of medium and low voltage aerial lines, pole mounted substations and overhead 
line disconnectors and disconnector stations replaced for improving reliability. In 
addition, maintenance costs related to forest management near medium voltage lines 
and development and maintenance costs of systems used to communicate with 
customers or the authorities fall within the scope of the security of supply incentive. 
(Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan) 
 
  25 25  
4. MULTI-LEVEL FEEDER PROTECTION 
The protection of radially operated medium voltage networks is typically arranged with 
single protection relay with both overcurrent and earth-fault protection functions at the 
beginning of each feeder. In this kind of simple protection scheme the whole feeder 
forms one protected zone. A fault occurring anywhere in this zone leads to temporary 
interruption for all the customers within that zone. As primary substations are generally 
situated close to major customer concentrations, most of the customers are situated at 
the beginning of feeders and suffer from faults at the end of the feeders. Current trend of 
emphasizing reliability and quality of supply gives cause to seek for more advanced 
protection arrangements.  
A straightforward way to improve customer experienced reliability is to introduce new 
protection zones or decrease the size of the current ones. The first option implies large 
changes to the network topology and could require major investments either at the 
substations or into the MV network. In the other option additional relays and circuit 
breakers would be installed on a same feeder in order to divide the existing protection 
zone into several smaller zones. In this thesis, a term multi-level protection is adopted 
for a protection scheme where two or more cascading relays are used for protection of a 
single feeder. 
Basic principles of reliability, operation speed, selectivity and cost efficiency of 
protection arrangement have to be considered when new elements are added to the 
current system. This means that the smallest possible section of feeder is always 
disconnected as fast as possible to minimize risk of equipment damage or injuries and 
unnecessary actions are avoided. (Gers & Holmes 2004) 
4.1 Operation principles 
In order to gain a reliability improvement from multiple relays on a feeder the 
selectivity of protection has to be ensured. For example, if the first relay operates in a 
case of two consecutive protection zones and a fault that occurs in the second zone, no 
benefit has been achieved compared with a case of only one zone. With sufficient 
discrimination margin between the relays the protection operates correctly. 
Depending on the type of the relay, discrimination for overcurrent protection can be 
achieved by time, current or both. Other more sophisticated means include interlocking 
of relays or use of differential or distance protection. (Teknillisiä tietoja ja taulukoita -
käsikirja 2000) 
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Discrimination by time is based on a time delay given for each relay. Relays closer to 
the beginning of the feeder have longer delays than those further along the feeder to 
ensure that the relay closest to the fault operates first. (Northcote-Green & Wilson 2007) 
Typically a delay of 0,2 to 0,3 seconds is sufficient between relays. This limits the 
number of consecutive relays as thermal capacity of components together with 
maximum overcurrent level defines the maximum time delay. 
Discrimination by current is based on fault current level. Current level varies according 
to the location of the fault because of impedance of the line. With enough distance 
between two relays, they can be set in such way, that only the nearest relay operates 
when fault occurs. (Northcote-Green & Wilson 2007) 
Combination of time and current based discrimination is achieved with inverse-time 
type relay. As the name suggests, relays operation time is inversely proportional  to the 
fault current and hence it is a function of time and current. Different characteristics 
curves are available, but settings have to be calculated carefully for multiple relay 
systems to ensure functionality and reliability of the system. (green, Wilson) 
Differential protection is based on measuring and comparing incoming and outgoing 
currents of protection zone. It is commonly used in transformer, machine and busbar 
protection and could be applied to feeder protection. (Teknillisiä tietoja ja taulukoita -
käsikirja 2000)  However, as current measurements are required from both ends of the 
protection zone, implementation of differential protection would be expensive because 
of the needed current transformers and communications. 
Distance relay measures impedance seen by the relay and therefore is unaffected by 
changes in short circuit current deviations. Distance protection is usually applied to 
protection of transmission lines, ring operated networks and electrically weak branch 
networks. Although distance relays perform solidly, they rely on time discrimination or 
communications to secure selective protection. (Teknillisiä tietoja ja taulukoita -
käsikirja 2000) 
Interlocking is a technique used to accelerate the operation speed of protection system. 
With two consecutive relays both detecting same fault, the primary relay sends an 
interlocking signal to the backup relay preventing its operation. This enables the 
utilization of shorter time delays between protection levels. A typical delay with 
interlocking enabled is approximately 100 ms depending on the relays used and 
communications between them. (Teknillisiä tietoja ja taulukoita -käsikirja 2000) 
In addition, modern relays have directional protection capabilities, which can be utilized 
in particular situations besides other means of discrimination. These situations include 
meshed network operation, parallel feeders and parallel transformers. (Bayliss & Hardy 
2007)Directional protection requires voltage measurement in addition to current 
measurement to be able to calculate the direction of the current flow. At substations 
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voltage transformers are already available, but elsewhere in the distribution network 
measurements are rare and have to be specifically arranged if directional protection is 
required. 
In earth fault situation the protection arrangements are somewhat more problematic. 
Most of the Finnish distribution networks are either isolated neutral or resonant earthed 
systems. In isolated neutral system the fault currents flows through fault impedance, line 
to ground capacitance and line impedances through main transformers windings to the 
faulty phase. Resonant earthed systems differ from isolated in that the line capacitance 
is almost totally compensated with inductive coil connected to main transformers 
neutral point thus lowering the fault current. This leads to small fault currents of only 
few amperes making earth faults more difficult to detect than short circuit faults 
(Lakervi & Partanen 2008). Flow of the current in isolated neutral system and resonant 
earthed system is presented in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, respectively. 
 
 
Earth faults can be detected with several different methods. For example, measured 
variable could be neutral point displacement voltage, phase voltage, zero current or 
current and voltage harmonics. Commonly used directional earth fault relays measures 
both magnitude and phase angle of fault current and compares it with neutral point 
displacement voltage to determine the direction of fault current. Additionally the 
Figure 4.1. Earth fault in isolated neutral system. Adopted from (Lakervi & Partanen
2008) 
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magnitudes of both current and voltage have to exceed a preset value for the relay to 
operate. (Lakervi & Partanen 2008) 
The directional earth fault relay works selectively in isolated neutral network with one 
relay at the beginning of each relay in the sense that only the faulted feeder is 
disconnected. Relay operates correctively also in resonant earthed network, if the earth 
fault current is not entirely compensated. Relays directional properties could also be 
utilized with consecutive relays on a same feeder as illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Earth fault in resonant earthed system. Adopted from (Lakervi & Partanen
2008) 
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In Figure 4.3 feeders F1 and F2 have two relays each. One is located at the beginning 
and the other in the middle of the feeder. In the event of earth fault at location a, fault 
current flows through relays R1…R4 as shown in the figure. Relays R1, R2 and R4 see 
the current flowing towards busbar and hence do not operate, whereas relay R3 detects 
flow of current towards feeder F2 in phase L3 and operates correctly. If the fault would 
occur at location b, relays R3 and R4 would both see almost the same fault current. 
Therefore a time delay is required between R3 and R4 to ensure discrimination. 
4.2 Benefits and challenges 
Major benefits emerging from functional and extensive multi-level protection system 
are related to reliability and quality of supply improvements. Increasing the number of 
protection zones in an existing distribution network self-evidently leads to smaller 
zones. Total amount of faults does not decrease, but as each smaller zone contains less 
network components and customers, faults per protection zone decline and number of 
customers suffering from a single fault drops.  
With cascading protection zones faults occurring in the first zone cause outages also for 
the customers in the second zone. Provided that adequate back up connections exist, the 
circuit breaker of the second protection zone brings no added benefits over a remote 
Figure 4.3. Directional earth fault relays R1…R4. Adopted from (Lakervi & Partanen
2008) 
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controlled disconnector as the time required to restore the supply via back up 
connection is the same for both. On the other hand, the reliability improvement seen by 
the customers in the first zone when a fault occurs in the second protection zone is 
significant as in ideal situation all outages could be limited to the second zone only. 
According to (Keskeytystilasto 2012 2013), 90 % of customers interruption hours were 
caused by MV overhead line faults and 61 % of faults were weather related. As primary 
substations are usually located near the focus point of consumption, a large share of 
customers are connected to the beginning of MV feeders. If that part is built with a 
weather proof technique and another protection zone is composed of the rest of the 
feeder, the supply of most of the customers could be secured in normal operational 
situation and during major disturbances without having to renew the whole feeder.  
In many cases single feeder can be divided into more than two zones with careful 
selection of switching station placement, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. The switching 
station would be equipped with circuit breakers as illustrated in Figure 4.4. The 
incoming line could also be equipped with circuit breaker in order to prepare for 
changes in network topology where the direction of feeder is reversed but would be 
used as disconnector under normal situation. This is beneficial in several ways. Fault 
location is faster in smaller geographical areas and number of test switchings is reduced. 
Reclosings caused by transient faults in protection zones further along the feeder are 
seen as voltage dips in other zones instead of temporary outages.  
 
Figure 4.4. A schematic representation of switching station used in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Example of feeder, which could be divided into three different protection 
zones with two circuit breakers. Switching station is marked with red circle and 
protection zones are highlighted. 
As a downside, a more complex protection system may also increase the risk 
malfunctions caused by configuration errors or device breakdown. Malfunctions can 
mean a lack of correct operation when required or an incorrect operation when not 
required. Older relay types used at the primary substations may cause compatibility 
issues or limitations to functionality, if not renewed at the same time. Altogether, the 
price of the system may rise due to various challenges to a level where the benefits no 
longer outweigh the investment costs. 
4.3 Requirements 
Three alternative, practical implementation models for multi-level short circuit and 
earth fault protection  can be identified. Common requirements for all three include 
necessary network components relay, circuit breaker, current and voltage transformers 
or sensors, and communication equipment. Depending on the method of 
implementation, requirements set for relay or level of communication connection vary. 
In the most sophisticated case, advanced communications is utilized and intelligent 
relays discuss with each other to ensure correct coordination between relays. 
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Interlocking has been used mainly between feeder and busbar or main transformer 
protection in the primary substation on distribution level. In literature, IEC 61850 and 
its GOOSE messages has gained attention for the possibilities it offers in substation 
protection and control (Hou & Dolezilek 2008; Mackiewicz 2006). Real world 
examples of substation automation systems implemented with IEC 61850 can be found 
in (Matsuda et al. 2011; Kimuraet al. 2008).  
GOOSE messages are peer-to-peer messages capable of conveying multiple data types 
to other IEDs. Several message types with performance requirements have been 
specified according to application. Maximum transmission times for protection and fast 
control use are 10 or 3 ms, which includes the communication processing in both 
sending and receiving device as well as the actual transit time between the devices. 
(Hou & Dolezilek 2008) 
Currently GOOSE messages cannot be routed, which complicates message 
transformation between substations. A solution to this problem has been presented in 
(Skendzic & Moore 2006), where Virtual LAN (VLAN) has been used for 
intersubstation communication. With IEC 61850 compatible relays and substation 
communication, same principle could be applied to messaging between substation and 
remote circuit breaker. In this case, the communication network has to meet strict 
performance requirements, thus limiting the choices for communication media in 
practice to fiber optics. 
The second approach is based on active relays, that operates independently without 
communications according to a predefined algorithm in the event of fault. Such an 
arrangement is examined in (Jecu et al. 2011). In the proposed protection scheme relays 
measure impedance and roughly locates fault. Tripping time is then determined 
according to the faulted protection zone. Relay nearest to the fault sets its tripping time 
to minimum value. Next relay upstream adds a delay to its tripping time according to a 
predefined logic. First relay at the substation acts as backup with twice the delay and 
other relays in between do not trip at all. 
Compared to the first alternative, a simpler and slower field communications suffices. 
Relays operate independently and only status information is send to control center. 
Relay itself has to be capable of calculating the fault location without compromising its 
primary task of tripping the circuit breaker. As a downside, relay has to know the 
network it feeds at all times. This means that  relay has to be readjusted every time the 
feeder configuration is changed. In addition, earth fault location in compensated 
network is challenging. All things considered, the second alternative could be 
considered in a situation, where several consecutive protection zones are needed on a 
single feeder but communication based discrimination cannot be achieved. 
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Third alternative relies on time discrimination only. Number of consecutive relays is 
thus limited by the minimum operation time of the last relay on the feeder and 
maximum allowed operation time of the first relay at the substation. Maximum time is 
limited by the operation time of busbar protection, which is typically set to 
approximately one second. With 0,3 s time delay between relays the number of 
consecutive zones is hence three, when the minimum operation time is assumed to be 
0,2 s, which consists of operation times of relay and circuit breaker.  
This approach shares communication requirements with previous case, but could be 
implemented using ordinary relays. Relay settings are fixed and have to be determined 
and adjusted carefully according to the specific feeder. In some parts of the network 
selective protection might be impossible to achieve at all or several different sets of 
relay settings are needed to cover all possible operational situations. Compared to the 
other alternatives, the third one loses in versatility and about 0,1 s in operation speed. 
Table 4.1 Summary of alternative implementation models. 
Discrimination 
method 
Communication 
between relays 
Local fault location and 
predetermined logic 
Time delay 
Pros  Enables 
versatile 
protection 
arrangements 
 No limit to 
consecutive 
protection 
zones 
 Operates 
independently of 
communications 
 No limit to 
consecutive 
protection zones 
 Simple 
implementation 
Cons  Depends 
heavily on 
communicatio
ns 
 Complex 
system to 
configure and 
maintain 
  
 Depends on fault 
location accuracy 
 Settings have to 
be changed when 
feeder 
configuration is 
altered 
 Limited number 
of consecutive 
protection zones 
 Practical relay 
settings do not 
always exist 
 Settings may 
have to be 
changed when 
feeder 
configuration is 
altered 
Relay 
requirements 
High High Low 
Communications 
requirements 
High Low Low 
 
Key aspects of presented cases are summarized in Table 4.1. High relay requirements 
means that the relay has to be capable of logical decision making based on 
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predetermined rules and real-time measurements in addition to normal protection 
functions. High level communication requirements are similar to those usually 
associated with differential protection or HV network protection. This denotes response 
times of few milliseconds and no tolerance for errors or wait times (Strauss 2003).  
4.4 Basis for business case 
As discussed earlier, the major benefit of multi-level protection is improved reliability. 
Finnish regulator, Energy Authority (EA), has included a quality incentive in the 
regulation. The objective of this incentive is to encourage DSOs to improve the 
reliability by decreasing number and length of unexpected outages, planned outages and 
automatic reclosings. The incentive is deducted from the operating profit in the 
calculation of realized adjusted profit and therefore affects the allowed income of DSO. 
The calculation of the quality incentive takes into account half of the difference of 
reference outage costs from the years 2005-2010 and actual outage costs of the year in 
question (Sähkön jakeluverkkotoiminnan). In this context the actual outage denote 
disadvantage to customers caused by interruptions in the supply of electricity and is 
calculated for a certain year as presented in Chapter 3.1. 
As can be seen in Equation (3.1), the calculation of disadvantage to customers includes 
long unexpected or planned outages and short outages in a form of number of 
reclosings. Cost for long outages consists of two elements: interruption duration and 
amount both weighted with annual customer energy. Planned outages include outages 
related to maintenance, network alteration or building that customers have been notified 
of in advance. Similarly to fault interruptions, planned outage lengths and amounts are 
weighted with annual customer energy in calculation of disadvantage. Number of 
reclosings is also weighted with customer energies. 
In evaluation of financial viability of introducing multi-level protection to a part of 
distribution network calculation of customer interruption costs has a vital role. 
Investment costs of additional circuit breaker, relay and required communication 
equipment and attained improvements in interruption costs form the two key inputs to 
financial calculations. 
Interruption cost savings arise from the decreased number of customers affected by 
unexpected outages and reclosings. For the business case evaluation changes in  
interruption costs have to be estimated.  
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5. AUTOMATIC FAULT LOCATION, ISOLATION 
AND RESTORATION 
One of the most often referred feature of Smart Grid visions is the idea of self-healing 
network. As a matter a fact, this denotes a network capable of automatic fault location, 
isolation and service restoration (FLIR) to as many customers as possible. This kind of 
built-in ability of the distribution network to react to real-time events and to reconfigure 
itself leads to higher level of reliability and shorter customer experienced outage times.  
Normally when fault occurs, control center operator routinely start with trial switchings 
to identify the faulted section of the feeder. At first only the remote controlled 
switchgear is used but often manual operations are also needed by the field crew. After 
the fault has been located within a certain isolation area, situation is assessed and power 
is restored to those customers outside the faulted section for whom it can be done in a 
reasonable time. Usually manual restoration is used only if the fault repair is expected to 
last very long. After that the fault is repaired and swithcings are made to restore the pre 
fault situation.  
With FLIR enabled, the fault location could be based on other methods besides trial 
switching, such as measurements, fault passage indicators or probabilistic calculations. 
Besides faster fault location, FLIR enables faster isolation and restoration switchings 
with remote controlled switches. Optimal switching sequences are calculated 
automatically with boundary conditions considered. Manual switches have to be still 
operated by field crews. In most cases the field crew could concentrate on the actual 
fault repair, if the number of remote controlled devices is sufficiently high and the fault 
can be fixed in reasonable time so that the manual restoration can be omitted. 
5.1 Alternative methods 
The implementation of FLIR functionality could follow several different operational 
principles and methods. First and foremost, the level where the decisions are made can 
be chosen between control room level, substation level and field equipment level. This 
choice limits the range of technologies needed and sets requirements for 
communications and computing power of the equipment. Another choice greatly 
affecting the whole system is the method of fault location used. A variety of alternative 
approaches exist and two or more of these could be combined to create even more 
options. 
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A FLIR system controlled in the system level at the control room resembles the 
traditional system without FLIR. The only real difference is that the operator's reasoning 
and actions to open and close switching devices are replaced with algorithms run in 
DMS and SCADA. In the most basic configuration, FLIR only composes the switching 
program and control center operator approves and executes each step manually. This 
approach could be also used to gain knowledge of the real-life functionality of the FLIR 
in the first stage of implementation. Later when the performance has been confirmed 
configuration is changed to automatic operation mode, as has been the case in one 
Finnish DSO (Kuru et al. 2013). 
With the system level FLIR the calculation power of DMS can be fully utilized. 
Probabilistic reliability calculation is used to complement fault location based on 
measurements in the substation (Kuru et al. 2013). The most suitable backup connection 
for power restoration can be selected with the help of power flow calculation 
considering the reserve capacity of the lines. In addition, safety and suitability of the 
protection settings can be confirmed with a fault analysis. 
Some argue that the central decision making makes the system vulnerable (Azevedo et 
al. 2000). Data has to be gathered and transferred to the control center for processing 
and commands are sent back to field devices. Depending on the architecture of the 
communication system., a failure in communication equipment or connection may 
disrupt or halt the operation of the FLIR. On the other hand, the communications and 
DMS are vital to the normal activities in the control center and should be secured with 
backups. 
Local level or distributed FLIR represents the completely opposite ideology. Intelligent 
field devices share information with each other and make the necessary decisions 
independent of higher level systems. The decentralization means that the system is 
adaptive and less susceptible to failure of a single device, but at the same time quite 
complex from the perspective of the system configuration and dependent on 
communication network. 
 A simple example presented in (Higgins et al. 2011) and  Figure 5.1demonstrates one 
plausible solution. In the case, a MV feeder with two backup connections to two other 
substations is considered. Each of the feeders have two sectionalizing switches.  
In the event of a permanent fault between CB1 and ROS1, switches ROS3 and ROS4 
realize the situation as the feeder is no longer energized and initiate the isolation and  
restoration sequence. For this to work, each of the switches has to be conscious of the 
network topology. They call out for CB2 and CB3, respectively, and get back the 
response with information about available excess capacity. This is compared with 
prefault loads of the Feeder 1 to come up with a switching plan. ROS1 and ROS2 are 
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opened and ROS3 and ROS4 closed to isolate the faulted section and to transfer the 
remaining sections to both Feeder 2 and 3. (Higgins et al. 2011) 
 
 
Figure 5.1. A sample network with local FLIR functionality. (Higgins et al. 2011) 
The third option for FLIR implementation is a compromise between the two others. In 
this pattern, the FLIR functionality is handled by a dedicated computer unit at the 
substation. This station computer compiles all the information from the IEDs at the 
substation and in the supplied distribution network. Besides FLIR, the station computer 
could coordinate relay interlockings, employ novel fault location algorithms that require 
measurement data from the whole substations or support station-wide condition 
management of the equipment. (Valtari & Verho 2011) 
The advantages of station computer based FLIR over the other two options stem from 
practical reasons. Adding a component to complement the existing equipment at the 
substation rather than having to exchange all of the bay IEDs or to invest extensively on 
secondary substation automation makes the adaptation of new functionality a 
straightforward process. Primary substations have more likely already sufficient 
communications compared to that required in the local FLIR. In addition, from the 
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system configuration and maintenance viewpoint the station computer simplifies both 
initial and daily tasks. However, communication between control center and station 
computed is required. 
5.2 Comparison 
Both the centralized decision making based system represented by the control room and 
the substation level FLIR implementations and the distributed system of individual 
intelligent field devices have their own advances and disadvantages. A DSO has to 
consider these when deciding the operational principles of the FLIR. 
The centralized system structure embodies a simple and convenient system. Field 
devices send their data to control center and wait for the commands. Thus the system 
relies on the control center and a single fault in control center equipment paralyzes the 
whole system. In addition to the robustness, lack of openness and flexibility may be 
considered as systems disadvantage. (Ghorbani et al. 2013) 
Decentralized approach of the distributed system is more robust and flexible than the 
centralized solution. However, the communication is not optimal in all situations if the 
field agents discuss only with their neighbors. (Ghorbani et al. 2013)The more complex 
implementation requires powerful maintenance tools for surveillance and updating the 
field equipment. 
5.3 Requirements 
A FLIR system sets requirements mainly for two components of the distribution 
network. First is the field equipment needed to execute the switching actions either on 
its own or according to commands made elsewhere. The second major element is the 
communication system needed to convey the messages reliably and sufficiently fast 
between other subsystems. These requirements vary according to the chosen 
implementation model and the objectives set for the FLIR. 
With centralized decision making  ordinary remote controlled disconnectors suffices in 
the field. From the viewpoint of the disconnector this approach does not differ from a 
normal control center initiated operation. More requirements are placed on field 
equipment in the decentralized implementation, as decision making is expected of the 
field devices. Modern IED's are capable of this sort of functions and IEC 61850 presents 
one solution for peer to peer communication. 
The performance level of the FLIR system is largely determined by the quality and 
characteristics  of the communications system. Reliable and fast messaging is a 
fundamental requirement for a high performance FLIR implementation with well 
synchronized and controlled actions (Ghorbani et al. 2013) 
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Various communication technologies can be utilized. Based on the communication 
media, they can be divided to either wired or wireless communication. Whereas wireless 
links are cheaper and easier to implement, they are inherently unreliable and prone to 
interference. However, reliability can be improved with higher layer protocols and 
retransmission, at the cost of latency. Wired media is immune to interference, but also 
more expensive and remains susceptible to physical risks. (Ghorbani et al. 2013) 
In an ideal situation, the faulted section of the feeder would be isolated instantaneously 
after the fault has become a permanent one or even during the dead time of the delayed 
automatic reclosing sequence. Therefore, the latency of communications should be 
consistently low.  
The latencies of wired and wireless communication media was simulated and analyzed 
in (Ghorbani et al. 2013). Simulation was run with centralized, hierarchical and 
distributed architectures in a small system of 16 field agents. The hierarchical 
architecture corresponds to the station computer scenario presented in chapter 5.1. The 
results show that centralized and distributed systems with wired communications have 
the lowest total system latency in both best and worst case. The wireless communication 
media competes almost with wired solutions, if the reception probability is high. 
However, the deviation of best and worst case latency rises rapidly with wireless, if the 
reception probability declines. (Ghorbani et al. 2013) 
5.4 Viability 
The benefits of FLIR arise from the improved reliability including improved reliability 
indices, reduced customer outage costs and savings in fault repair costs. The origin of 
these improvements is illustrated in Figure 5.2.  
The course of actions triggered by a fault without FLIR in operation is outlined at the 
lower part of the figure. After the fault has been detected and confirmed to be 
permanent, it is reported in the  DMS and a fault repair crew is alerted. The crew then 
drives to the assumed area of the fault. Some rough location could be gained via 
experimental switchings before the repair crew arrives if remote controlled 
disconnectors exist or recorded fault current is available to DMS for attempt of fault 
location calculation. After the crew arrives, fault is patrolled and investigated. When the 
exact location is found, the decision to manually restore power to the healthy sections of 
the feeder is made based on the presumed repair time. Finally, the fault is repaired and 
the feeder is restored to its original state. (Aguero 2012) 
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Figure 5.2. Reliability improvement due to implementation of FLIR. Adopted from 
(Aguero 2012) 
With FLIR enabled, the most significant difference is that power is restored to the 
healthy parts of the feeder during the first few minutes. Naturally, only remote 
controlled switches can be used and fault location has to be successful. The patrol time 
is decreased as the repair crew can be guided closer to the precise fault location based 
on initial location and hence the actual repairs are started earlier than without FLIR. If 
remote controlled switches are sparse, manual restoration is still executed if repair work 
is tedious. 
In total, FLIR saves 45-75 minutes of outage time for those customers outside the 
faulted section and 10-25 minutes for those inside the faulted section, according to 
(Aguero 2012). In this example only manual disconnectors are available without FLIR. 
The actual times may vary and are certainly more or less DSO specific as fault 
management practices and level of network automation impacts the figures. 
Nevertheless, even a few minutes saved per customer could result in substantial COC 
savings over a period of a year if the number of outages, customers experiencing 
outages or level of automation increases. 
In addition to decreased COC, FLIR also improves related reliability indices, such as 
SAIDI and SAIFI, and reduces energy not supplied to customers due to outages. 
Accurate fault location reduces fault repair costs in total as less time is spent on 
patrolling. 
 
 
WITH FLIR
WITHOUT FLIR
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6. DEFINING THE CASE STUDIES 
In order to be able to evaluate the financial meaningfulness of multi-level protection or 
FLIR, some estimate of the potential savings has to be made. Easiest way is to calculate 
interruption cost decreases and further the effects on DSO's allowed income through the 
quality incentive of the regulatory model. Six cases with different amount and 
placement of remote controlled disconnectors and circuit breakers were determined. 
Calculations were carried out in two parts of the distribution network. 
6.1 Reliability based network analysis -tool 
Reliability effects of multi-level protection and FLIR were calculated with Trimble NIS. 
Trimble NIS is a network information system, which incorporates versatile tools for 
network analyzes, calculations and planning. Reliability calculation is possible with 
Reliability-based Network Analysis -tool (RNA) based on work done in LuoVa project. 
LuoVa project was a research project aimed to develop a model and a prototype tool for 
distribution network reliability calculation and analyzing purposes. Project was carried 
out in 2002-2005 in collaboration with several DSOs, IT system suppliers and research 
groups. As a result, a versatile component level fault model was created and 
demonstrated in a prototype program developed on top of ABB's existing NIS. Further 
development work was left to companies involved in project. (Verho et al. 2005) 
Network model in RNA-tool consist of overhead lines, covered overhead lines, 
underground cables, secondary substations and disconnectors. Components that have 
smaller impact on fault frequency are modelled as combined other component. Each 
component has certain identified failure modes, for which fault frequencies are defined. 
For instance, wind/snow and other are the two failure modes of overhead line. In 
addition, weight factors are used to adjust fault frequencies depending on the 
environment, condition or other reasons. Overall RNA-tool has over hundred different 
weight factors in use. Based on the fault frequencies and weight factors a total fault 
frequency is determined for each component and total fault interruptions caused by 
individual components are calculated. Similar model is used to calculate work 
interruptions and reclosings. (Verho et al. 2005; Administrator's Guide 2012) 
Interruption duration is calculated for each zone of the feeder, which is separable by 
switching device. Algorithm imitates a typical fault clearance procedure, which is 
illustrated in Figures Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2. (Verho et al. 2005) 
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Figure 6.1 Example feeder. (Verho et al. 2005) 
Figure 6.1 represents the example feeder in normal situation. Cross at the top denotes 
circuit breaker and feeding point of the network. Single lines are closed disconnectors 
and double lines open disconnectors. Letters describe the control mode of the switching 
devices (M = manual, K = remote controlled). Back-up connections to other feeders are 
illustrated with dashed lines. Distribution substations are represented by double circles 
at the end of each branch. (Verho et al. 2005) 
The fault clearance process is depicted in Figure 6.2. Faulted part is denoted by 
lightning symbol in the middle of the feeder and the affected area is outlined by grey 
dashed line. First the algorithm locates zones, that are remotely disconnectable and 
restorable (yellow zones). Areas, that can be remotely disconnected but remote 
restoration is not possible (blue zones), are also noted in this stage. The possibility of 
manual reconnection is checked later for these areas. (Verho et al. 2005) 
Next the remotely disconnected fault area is defined as the area outlined in red in Figure 
6.2. Zones inside the area are examined to identify manually disconnectable zones 
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(green zones). At the same time those remotely disconnectable zones with no remote 
controlled back-up connections are re-examined for the existence of manual back-up 
connections. In the example network the lower blue area can be restored with manual 
disconnector. However, it is also included in a larger zone, which could be disconnected 
and restored manually (orange zone). The final fault area is illustrated as the red area. 
The blue area in the left experiences also the interruption as no back-up connection 
exists. (Verho et al. 2005) 
 
Figure 6.2 Zone model used for simulating fault clearance in RNA-tool. Adopted from 
(Verho et al. 2005; Koponen 2013) 
Interruption times in different zones results from the operation mode of the 
disconnectors and the availability of reserve connections. Manual and remote 
disconnections are always done as well as remote restorations, but the execution of 
manual restoration depends on fault repair time. If the fault can be repaired in a 
reasonable time, manual restoration is omitted. Interruption times in different zones and 
the parameters affecting them are presented in Table 6.1. (Verho et al. 2005) 
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Table 6.1 Experienced interruption times in different areas with default parameters. 
 
6.2 Calculation parameters 
Calculation parameters for RNA-tool were originally determined in 2012 based on 
actual reported fault statistics from 2005 to 2011 as part of a Master's thesis. Initial 
parameter values were defined individually for five operational areas used in outage 
reporting. (Koponen 2013) Since then the environmental information for overhead lines 
has been improved with the utilization of results from MV network helicopter 
inspections. All of the MV overhead lines were photographed and scanned with laser. 
The number of trees capable of falling over a certain line part was interpreted from the 
laser data and environment of the line was determined on Trimble's four level scale, 
where 1 denotes open areas and 4 fault prone forest. At the same time the area division 
of the parameters was refined to cover 9 geographical asset areas and the parameters 
were adjusted to match the calculated outage costs and amounts to actual average 
regional values. 
For the purposes of this thesis some parameters had to be revised. The values for 
parameters affecting manual and remote disconnection times were readjusted based on 
fault statistics from the year 2013. Longer sample period could not be obtained, as the 
disconnection times for manual and remote switching have not been reported before for 
individual faults. Results for urban and rural area presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Disconnection times. 
Parameter Urban Rural 
RnaTimeIsoRemote 9 min 12 min 
RnaTimeIsoManual 51 min 71 min 
 
Disconnection and restoration with remote control
RnaTimeIsolRemote 5 min
Disconnection with remote control, restoration with manual disconnector (if possible)
RnaTimeRestManualMV 60 min
Disconnection with manual disconnector, restoration with remote control 
RnaTimeIsolManual 45 min
Disconnection and restoration with manual disconnectors
RnaTimeRestManualMV 60 min
Final fault zone (repair time)
RnaFaultRepairTimeMV
RnaTimeFixTrafo
RnaTimeFixCableMV
120 min
150 min
240 min
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RNA-tool has a separate parameters for fault location function in short-circuit and earth 
faults. Fault location reduces the time of manual disconnection and fault repair by 
default with 20 minutes. As no better information was available and the value seemed 
reasonable considering the manual switching times, default parameter was used in FLIR 
simulation. Calculations were also carried out with the parameter set to 30 minutes to 
gain understanding of the impact the parameter has. In addition, remote disconnection 
time was set to 1 minute. Assumption was that no notable delay would be caused by 
effective field communications. 
6.3 Area for analysis 
The focus of reliability analysis is to estimate the achievable reliability benefits of 
multi-level protection and FLIR in comparison to the current reliability level. For 
practical reasons the analysis was conducted for a MV distribution network fed by a 
single substation instead of the whole distribution network. To gain a better 
understanding of the impact the network structure has on the results, two different 
substations were selected. The selected substations represent typical urban or city area 
and rural area. 
6.3.1 Urban area 
The urban area selected for analysis is presented in Figure 6.3. Located in southern 
Espoo, Niittykumpu substation feeds the surrounding residential areas of Haukilahti, 
Olari and parts of Matinkylä, as well as industrial area in Niittykumpu and city-like area 
center of Tapiola. Residential areas consist mostly of densely built row houses and 
detached houses in between and apartment buildings at the center of each area. Highway 
51 running through the area in east-west direction is lined with offices and various 
stores. Commercial life is centered in Tapiola at the edge of the distribution area of 
Niittykumpu substation. 
The substation has two 40 MVA primary transformers and a total of fifteen medium 
voltage feeders. It supplies just over 20000 customers with annual energy of 250 GWh. 
Total MV network length adds up to 96,5 kilometers. 
MV network is almost entirely underground cable with a few exception of aerial cables 
used. Secondary substations are either pad mounted or indoor substations. Most of the 
substations are equipped with line disconnectors and cables are usually disconnectable 
from both ends. However, all of the disconnectors operate manually as remote control 
has been considered unnecessary in cable network. 
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Figure 6.3 Niittykumpu substation area. Substation is highlighted with red square. 
Network fed by the two main transformers is highlighted with light and dark blue. 
Table 6.3. The feeders of Niittykumpu substation. 
Feeder Customers Distribution substations Length/km Pmax/MW 
B04 Orion 180 1 2,4 0,61 
B05 Hakalehto 1220 17 6,3 3,54 
B06 Olari 2604 21 10,7 4,85 
B09 Mankkaa 31 6 2,2 1,73 
B10 Ahertajantie 6 1 2,5 0,68 
B11 Länsimetro 2318 14 5,9 3,04 
B12 Länsiväylä 2445 29 20,7 7,58 
B16 M21521 0 1 1,4 0,00 
B17 Itätuulentie 449 10 4,6 3,17 
B18 Toppelund 2262 14 6,9 4,29 
B19 Haukilahti 2413 17 7,6 4,70 
B22 Piispankallio 904 6 3,9 1,17 
B23 Matinkylä 1275 8 3,9 2,25 
B24 Suomenoja 2468 21 10,7 5,25 
B25 Lukupuro 615 12 6,8 3,32 
Sum 19190 178 96,5 46,18 
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Table 6.3 shows the basic information about the feeders in the study. As typical to urban 
feeders, the length of the feeders remain quite low, but the customer amount per feeder 
can still climb high. Remote controlled disconnectors could be easily positioned at the 
points where the feeder branches out or connects with adjacent feeder. Usually a pad 
mounted secondary substation with three or four disconnectors is already present at 
these points. 
For the purposes of this study, the existing secondary substations were used and 
disconnectors converted to remote controlled. Locations were chosen to maximize  the 
number of remote controlled sections and remote controlled back-up connections while 
keeping the sections reasonable and equally spaced. 
6.3.2 Rural area 
Rural substation area is presented in Figure 6.4. It covers the municipalities of Koski Tl 
and Marttila in Southwest Finland fed by Selkä substation. The substation is located 
approximately 4 kilometers from the main population center of Koski Tl and 15 
kilometers from the center of Marttila. 
The Selkä substation has a single 25 MVA primary transformer and 6 MV feeders. The 
substation is situated along a HV line and can be fed by two circuits. However, this 
study focuses on the medium voltage network reliability and both HV and primary 
transformer or busbar faults are neglected. In total 3500 customers with annual energy 
consumption of 63 GWh are supplied via 300 km of medium voltage lines. 
Table 6.4. The feeders of Selkä substation. 
Feeder Customers Distribution substations Length/km Pmax/MW 
SLKJ05  102 15 17,3 0,71 
SLKJ06  784 63 64,1 1,63 
SLKJ07  876 40 29,2 2,07 
SLKJ08  279 35 36,6 0,59 
SLKJ09  1111 89 95,1 2,78 
SLKJ10  387 52 55,2 1,00 
Sum  3539 294 297,6 8,78 
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Most of MV network is old overhead line. Newer parts have been built with  covered 
conductors or cables. The current cabling rate is just over 5 percent and 90 percent of all 
the secondary substations are pole mounted. In contrast to urban network, a total of 
eight remote controlled disconnector stations are located at the junctions of adjacent 
feeders, two of which are older pole mounted versions and the other newer pad mounted 
ones. In addition, one pad mounted substations is equipped with circuit breaker in the 
center of Koski Tl, which is fed by the purple feeder in Figure 6.4. The purpose of the 
circuit breaker is to isolate the faults of the downstream rural part of the feeder. 
However, the circuit was not taken into account in the reliability calculations. 
The basic information about the feeders of rural area are gathered in Table 6.4. While 
the feeders are significantly longer than in urban area both the number of customers and 
maximum power are obviously lower. Additionally, less back-up connections with other 
feeders or internal loops are available. In contrast to the entirely cabled network design, 
the aerial network makes the placement of the remote controlled disconnectors more 
challenging. In this study the existing line disconnectors were converted from manual to 
remote operation in order to be able to analyze just the reliability influence of the 
increased automation. Although in some feeders this approach exaggerates the number 
of disconnector substations but as this is a matter of feeder topology compromises have 
to be made also in real life. 
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Figure 6.4 Selkä substation area. Substation is highlighted with red square. Red dots 
represent remote controlled disconnector stations and yellow dot secondary substation 
with a circuit breaker. 
6.4 Cases 
In total 15 different cases were defined for reliability calculations, six of which are 
common for both urban and rural networks. The effect of FLIR was studied in cases 1 to 
4 and multi-level protection in cases 5 and 6. The objective was to attain the benefits of 
added automation functionalities, but as the current amount of remote controlled 
switchgear greatly influences the gained results, especially with FLIR, the number and 
placement of remote controlled disconnectors was varied throughout the cases. 
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A situation with no remote controlled switchgear except for the circuit breakers at the 
substation was chosen for a reference level. This was also the current situation in the 
urban network and therefore a natural choice for case 1. In case 2, remote controlled 
disconnectors were added to the open points between adjacent feeders. For the next 
case, a remote controlled disconnector station was added in a suitable position at 
approximately half way down the feeder. A place where the feeder split into two or 
more branches was favored to maximize the number of remote controlled sections. For 
rural network the current existing disconnector stations complemented with the backup 
disconnectors served as case 3. Case 4 was similar to previous case, but the feeder was 
further divided into smaller sections. In urban network, a second disconnector station 
could be added at another junction point. Due to sparser network structure, a slightly 
different approach was adopted in rural network, where single pole mounted 
disconnectors were used for longer branches. 
Multi-level protection was simulated in cases 5 and 6. First in case 5 a switching station 
equipped with one or two circuit breakers was placed at the same location as the 
disconnector station in case 3. No additional automation was present. In case 6 remote 
controlled backup disconnectors were added. All the cases are presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Common cases for urban and rural networks.  
Case 1 No remote controlled switchgear 
Case 2 Remote controlled backup connections 
Case 3 Remote controlled backup connections, feeders remotely divisible at half way 
Case 4 Remote controlled backup connections, feeders remotely divisible at several 
points 
Case 5 Circuit breaker 
Case 6 Circuit breaker and remote controlled backup connections 
 
Rest of the cases 7 through 15 presented in Table 6.6 concern only rural network. 
Recent changes in Electricity Market Act lead inevitably towards a more weatherproof 
network. Anticipated changes in network technology presumably focus more on rural 
areas than already cabled urban centers. Purpose of these cases is to determine whether 
an increase in weather resistance and therefore improved basic reliability level renders 
automation functionalities purposeless. 
Weatherproofing rate was increased from the default 59 % of the Selkä substation area 
at the time of the study gradually to 87 % with MV cabling. First the trunk of the feeder 
was cabled to the disconnector/switching station. In the next phase the branches at the 
beginning of the feeder were changed to cables. Lastly, cabling was extended to cover 
the trunk line all the way to the end of the feeder. Weatherproof network was in this 
instance defined as underground cables or overhead lines with either plain or covered 
conductors in the treeless areas. The locations of cabled sections were roughly 
optimized with respect to the customer and energy consumption density. The fault 
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frequency of individual lines could be also considered, but the chosen method was 
deemed adequate for estimation of impact of weatherproofing on FLIR. 
Calculations were carried out first without any automation to gain understanding of the 
reliability improvement caused by chances in the network structure. Then the existing 
remote controlled disconnectors were added for cases 10-12 and finally the same circuit 
breaker locations used in case 5. 
Table 6.6 Cases for rural network with increased MV cabling. 
Case 7 No remote controlled switchgear, weatherproofing rate 67 % 
Case 8 No remote controlled switchgear, weatherproofing rate 73 % 
Case 9 No remote controlled switchgear, weatherproofing rate 87 % 
Case 10 Existing remote controlled disconnectors, weatherproofing rate 67 % 
Case 11 Existing remote controlled disconnectors, weatherproofing rate 73 % 
Case 12 Existing remote controlled disconnectors, weatherproofing rate 87 % 
Case 13 Circuit breaker and existing remote controlled disconnectors, weatherproofing 
rate 67 % 
Case 14 Circuit breaker and existing remote controlled disconnectors, weatherproofing 
rate 73 % 
Case 15 Circuit breaker and existing remote controlled disconnectors, weatherproofing 
rate 87 % 
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7. CALCULATION RESULTS 
The calculations were conducted in Trimble NIS with actual distribution network. As 
Trimble was not the primary network information system and the network model was 
only updated at a certain interval, both substation areas were first examined to verify the 
calculation situation. To begin with, the feeders were aligned with the normal situation 
as shown in DMS.  
Then the customer amount per feeder was checked against the DMS. While the rural 
substation was in line with the DMS, the urban are lacked nearly 2000 customers. This 
was mostly caused by shortages in the documentation of ongoing projects at the time of 
previous network update and problems with certain types of customer connections. 
However, after manual repairs the number of customers still missing from Trimble was 
decreased to just under 1000 customers. As this was common to all of the cases and the 
maximum power in load flow calculation matched the measured power no further 
measures were taken to improve the situation. 
Lastly, the annual total energy supplied to the network was compared with actual 
measurement from the substations. On both substations the calculated value was found 
out to be well in line considering the calculation parameters. 
Before the calculations were carried out both parameter sets for RNA-tool were adjusted 
to match the reported fault amounts and customer outage costs of each substation to 
gain more accurate results. Average statistics from the years 2009 to 2012 were used as 
older statistics was considered insufficient in terms of data quality. The statistics are 
presented in Appendix 2. 
A separate plan was then prepared in Trimble NIS for both network areas and for each 
case. Required chances to existing network were made and reliability calculations were 
carried out with three different parameter sets. Results from first calculations without 
FLIR were used as reference. The second and third parameter sets simulated FLIR with 
20 and 30 minute improvement to the fault location and repair process. 
7.1 Urban 
The first six cases were studied in the urban network. In this chapter the location of 
added automation is presented case by case and reliability calculation results are 
analyzed.  
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Case 1 
Case 1 is used as reference for other cases. As no remote controlled disconnectors have 
been installed in the particular area, the actual network was used. Error! Reference 
source not found. shows the basic information about the feeders in the study. As 
typical to urban feeders, the length of the feeders remain quite low, but the customer 
amount can still climb high.  
Case 2 
For case 2 remote controlled back-up disconnectors were added to every open point 
between adjacent feeders. The placement of these disconnectors is illustrated in Figure 
7.1. In total 40 disconnectors were converted from manual to remote control with an 
average of 2,7 per feeder. 
 
Figure 7.1. Case 2 for urban area. Remote controlled disconnectors are highlighted 
with red dots and primary substation with red square. 
Case 3 
Compared with case 2, more remote controlled disconnectors were added. The objective 
was to add disconnectors roughly in the middle of the feeder. If possible, a substation 
with two or more disconnectors was chosen to divide the feeder into several sections. 
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Some of the locations presented in Figure 7.2 were the same as those in case 1. In 
addition to the previous, 29 new remote controlled disconnectors were added to 13 
secondary substations resulting in an average of 2,2 remote controlled sections per 
feeder. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Case 3 for urban area. Remote controlled disconnectors are highlighted 
with red dots and primary substation with red square. 
Case 4 
For case 4 the feeders were further divided into smaller section. Remote controlled 
disconnectors were placed in three points along the feeder in addition to the back-up 
disconnectors. At the end the number of disconnectors on the feeders increased to 59 in 
23 different secondary substations. The average number of remote controlled sections 
per feeder was 3,5. Placement of the substations is illustrated in Figure 7.3 
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Figure 7.3. Case 5 for urban area. Remote controlled disconnectors are highlighted 
with red dots and primary substation with red square. 
Cases 5 & 6 
In cases 5 and 6 the impact of added protection zones was studied. Case 5 included only 
added circuit breakers and in case 6 the same remote controlled back-up disconnectors 
were introduced from case 2 to add the possibility of remote restoration on the farthest 
protection zones. The circuit breakers were located at the existing secondary substations 
replacing the manual disconnectors. The locations are presented in Figure 7.4. In total 
19 circuit breakers were added to 11 secondary substations. Thus creating 19 new 
protection zones to bring the average number of protection zones to 2,3 per feeder.  
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Figure 7.4. The locations of substations with circuit breakers in cases 5 and 6. 
Calculation results 
The reference level of results for each case is shown in Table 7.1. As the switches do 
not have a fault frequency defined in the RNA-calculation parameters, the number of 
faults stays constant in all of the cases. In reality the difference between manual and 
remote controlled disconnectors is negligible as the actual disconnectors are identical 
and the added control mechanism and communications do not cause outage if it 
malfunctions. On the other hand, circuit breakers are expected to have different fault 
frequency compared with a disconnector but still the effect on the fault frequency of the 
whole network is minimal. 
  
7 CALCULATION RESULTS 57 
Table 7.1. Results for urban area without FLIR. 
Faults 
[pcs/a] 
Sum of fault interruption 
hours of customers [h/a] SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI COC [€/a] 
Case 1 3,30 4 730 0,314 0,301 1,045 95 631
Case 2 3,30 4 188 0,277 0,301 0,923 87 367
Case 3 3,30 2 284 0,178 0,301 0,593 56 073
Case 4 3,30 1 784 0,152 0,301 0,506 48 638
Case 5 3,30 3 111 0,221 0,202 1,098 64 355
Case 6 3,30 2 052 0,166 0,202 0,825 49 128
 
With cases 1 to 4 the SAIFI is unchanged as the interruption frequency does not change 
with the addition of remote controlled disconnectors. The effect of remote controlled on  
the fault isolation can yet be seen in the other figures which show a steady decrease. 
This is caused by the reduction of fault isolation times with remote control over manual 
operation. For example, the customer outage costs decrease by approximately 50 % in 
both case 4 and 6 compared with the case 1. On the other hand, the circuit breakers in 
cases 5 and 6 impact all of the reliability indices. Compared with cases 1 and 2 a 
significant decrease in COC is notable. 
Table 7.2. Results for urban area with FLIR improving fault location by 20 min. 
Faults 
[pcs/a] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [h/a] SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI COC [€/a] 
Case 1 3,30 4 657 0,310 0,301 1,032 94 311
Case 2 3,30 4 077 0,272 0,301 0,904 85 359
Case 3 3,30 1 894 0,158 0,301 0,525 49 748
Case 4 3,30 1 344 0,129 0,301 0,430 41 649
Case 5 3,30 3 037 0,217 0,202 1,079 63 124
Case 6 3,30 1 869 0,157 0,202 0,777 46 350
 
Table 7.3. Results for urban area with FLIR improving fault location by 30 min. 
Faults 
[pcs/a] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [h/a] SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI COC [€/a] 
Case 1 3,30 4 621 0,308 0,301 1,026 93 651
Case 2 3,30 4 022 0,269 0,301 0,894 84 355
Case 3 3,30 1 872 0,157 0,301 0,522 49 384
Case 4 3,30 1 302 0,127 0,301 0,423 40 957
Case 5 3,30 2 999 0,216 0,202 1,069 62 509
Case 6 3,30 1 831 0,155 0,202 0,767 45 735
 
The results with FLIR enabled are presented in Tables Table 7.2 and Table 7.3. The 
benefit of FLIR over the reference is calculated in Tables Table 7.4 and Table 7.5. From 
7 CALCULATION RESULTS 58 
Table 7.4 it can be seen that FLIR functionality improves the calculation results slightly 
even with no added automation available. In cases 3 and 4 a significant improvement is 
noted especially with COC and customer fault interruption hours. However, the ten 
minute decrease in fault location and repair times in Table 7.5 shows only minor effect 
on the results. With the additional protection zones in cases 5 and 6, the implementation 
of FLIR brings even larger improvement over the base cases. It should be noted, that 
without the remote controlled back-up disconnectors the circuit breakers have little 
benefit to FLIR. 
Table 7.4. The benefit of FLIR with 20 min improvement in fault location. 
Faults 
[%] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [%] 
SAIDI 
[%] 
SAIFI 
[%] 
CAIDI 
[%] COC [%] 
Case 1 0,0 1,5 1,2 0,0 1,2 1,4
Case 2 0,0 2,6 2,1 0,0 2,1 2,3
Case 3 0,0 17,1 11,4 0,0 11,4 11,3
Case 4 0,0 24,6 15,1 0,0 15,1 14,4
Case 5 0,0 2,4 1,8 0,0 1,8 1,9
Case 6 0,0 8,9 5,8 0,0 5,8 5,7
 
Table 7.5. The benefit of FLIR with 30 min improvement in fault location. 
Faults 
[%] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [%] 
SAIDI 
[%] 
SAIFI 
[%] 
CAIDI 
[%] COC [%] 
Case 1 0,0 2,3 1,8 0,0 1,8 2,1
Case 2 0,0 4,0 3,1 0,0 3,1 3,4
Case 3 0,0 18,0 12,0 0,0 12,0 11,9
Case 4 0,0 27,0 16,5 0,0 16,5 15,8
Case 5 0,0 3,6 2,6 0,0 2,6 2,9
Case 6 0,0 10,8 6,9 0,0 6,9 6,9
 
The benefit gained from adding the circuit breakers is presented in Table 7.6. Increased 
number of protection zones decreases the COC and customer fault interruption hours by 
approximately 33 %. Combined with the remote controlled back-up connections for 
faster restoration of healthy sections the numbers are decreased by 44 % and 51 %, 
respectively. System level interruption indices SAIDI and SAIFI show also significant 
improvements but in the case of interruption hours experienced by a single customer the 
effect is smaller. In fact, CAIDI actually increases in case 5. 
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Table 7.6. The benefit of circuit breakers without the effect of FLIR. 
Faults 
[%] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [%] 
SAIDI 
[%] 
SAIFI 
[%] 
CAIDI 
[%] COC [%] 
Case 5 0,0 34,2 29,5 33,0 -5,1 32,7
Case 6 0,0 51,0 40,1 33,0 10,7 43,8
7.2 Rural 
In the rural network all of the cases were studied. In this chapter the location of added 
automation is presented case by case and reliability calculation results are analyzed. 
Case 1 
Being the reference case for all other cases, the existing remote controlled disconnectors 
were converted to manual disconnectors and circuit breakers were removed.  
Case 2 
For case 2 remote controlled back-up disconnectors were added to every open point 
between adjacent feeders. The placement of these disconnectors is illustrated in Figure 
7.5. In total 21disconnectors were converted from manual to remote control with an 
average of 3,5 per feeder. 
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Figure 7.5. Case 2 for rural area. Remote controlled disconnectors are highlighted with 
red dots and primary substation with red square.  
Case 3 
As with case 3, the objective was to add disconnectors roughly in the middle of the 
feeder in addition to the disconnectors from case 2. Since almost every feeder already 
had a disconnector substation the existing 5 stations with 11 remote controlled 
disconnectors resulting in an average of 2,5 remote controlled section per feeder were 
used. Most of these disconnectors illustrated in Figure 7.6 are in the same substations as 
back-up disconnectors. 
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Figure 7.6. Case 3 for rural area. Remote controlled disconnectors are highlighted with 
red dots and primary substation with red square. 
Case 4 
In case 4 the number of remote controlled section increased to an average of 5,5 per 
feeder as a result of 14 new remote controlled disconnectors. As illustrated in Figure 
7.7, the disconnectors are placed individually either at the beginning of longer branches 
or in the middle of the feeder thus denoting also 14 new locations.  
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Figure 7.7. Case 4 for rural area. Remote controlled disconnectors are highlighted with 
red dots and primary substation with red square. 
Cases 5 & 6 
The locations of added circuit breakers in cases 5 and 6 are presented in Figure 7.8. 
Case 5 included only added circuit breakers and in case 6 the same remote controlled 
back-up disconnectors were introduced from case 2 to add the possibility of remote 
restoration on the farthest protection zones. The circuit breakers were located at the 
existing secondary substations replacing the manual disconnectors. In total 9 circuit 
breakers were added to 5 secondary substations. 9 new protection zones were added in 
the process to increase the average number of protection zones to 2,3 per feeder. 
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Figure 7.8. The locations of substations with circuit breakers in cases 5 and 6. 
Cases 7-15 
Cases 7-15 were specific for rural network. Figures Figure 7.9 through Figure 7.11 
present the network structures common to all the cases. Underground cables are denoted 
with yellow lines whereas pink represents covered conductors and blue plain overhead 
lines. The current network structure used in cases 1-6 has a weatherproofing rate of 
approximately 59 % including underground cables and overhead lines with either plain 
or covered conductors in treeless areas. The source of the environmental information 
was Corine Land Cover data available in Trimble NIS. From there the weatherproofing 
rate was increased by the means of replacing the overhead lines with underground 
cables. This was done in the same place as the original lines were to negate the effect 
the changes in line length to the RNA calculation. 
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Figure 7.9. Rural area with 67 % weatherproofing rate. Cabled lines are in yellow. 
Table 7.7 summarizes the cabling rate and the share of residual overhead lines that 
remain susceptible to falling trees corresponding to different weatherproofing rates. 
Notably the initial weatherproofing rate is relatively high compared to the cabling rate. 
From the nearly constant forest rate of the remaining overhead lines it can be concluded 
that the forest patches are somewhat uniformly distributed in the area and thus the 
overall fault frequency of the overhead lines is approximately constant along the feeder. 
In this study, the overhead line replacement was not optimized according to the 
surrounding environment in order to minimize the cable length. This is evident from 
both the rapidly rising cabling rate as well as the constant forest rate. With optimization 
the required cabling rate would be somewhat lower. However, the simulated cases 
represents decently a real life situation, where also other boundary conditions, such as 
land lease contracts and fault frequency of cable terminals have to be considered and 
likely the resulting cabling rate is above the optimal rate. 
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Table 7.7. The network structure in cases 7-15. 
Weatherprooging 
rate [%] 
Cabling degree 
[%] 
Share of remaining overhead lines 
susceptible to falling trees [%] 
59,3 5,1 42,9 
67,2 23,6 42,9 
72,5 38,6 44,7 
87,1 70,5 43,7 
 
The calculations were conducted on the case networks first without any network 
automation to gain the base reliability level for later comparisons. Then the existing 
remote controlled disconnectors were added and calculations repeated. Finally the third 
round included also the added circuit breakers. Same locations were used as in cases 5 
and 6. In addition, all of the network configurations were calculated without FLIR and 
with FLIR. With all these results individual effects of remote controlled disconnectors, 
circuit breakers and FLIR were identifiable. 
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Figure 7.10. Rural area with 73 weatherproofing rate. Cabled lines are in yellow. 
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Figure 7.11. Rural area with 87 weatherproofing rate. Cabled lines are in yellow. 
Calculation results 
The reference results for other cases are presented in Table 7.8. Compared with the 
urban results, all of the numbers are significantly higher even though the number of 
customer, affecting especially the COC, is by far lower. This simply denotes that the 
more frequent faults take longer to repair and as the back-up connections are sparse or 
nonexistent and distances between manual disconnectors are lengthy, the customers 
suffer longer outages. While the relative improvement gained from the addition of 
remote control is only slightly larger than in the urban scenario the absolute savings in 
COC is much greater.  
The added circuit breakers seem to have less impact on the rural network.  While they 
certainly lower the COC, the effect on reliability indices is smaller than in urban 
network results. This is explained by the network topology with fewer possibilities to 
restore power behind the faulted section and long branches without any backup 
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connections. The high fault interruption hours with lower COC suggests that large part 
of the load is located in the first protection zone. On the other hand, these protection 
zones are quite large and in general the load can be quite evenly distributed in rural 
networks in the absence of larger towns or industrial clients. 
Table 7.8. Results for rural area without FLIR. 
Faults 
[pcs/a] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [h/a] SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI COC [€/a] 
Case 1 16,67 22 227 6,494 3,837 1,692 497 793
Case 2 16,67 21 954 6,416 3,837 1,672 469 692
Case 3 16,67 9 230 2,828 3,837 0,737 273 350
Case 4 16,67 5 835 1,871 3,837 0,488 214 107
Case 5 16,67 13 500 4,030 2,127 1,894 296 668
Case 6 16,67 8 753 2,693 2,129 1,265 238 706
 
As with the urban area, the introduction of FLIR further improves the results from the 
reliability point of view, as can be seen in Tables Table 7.9 and Table 7.10. Even with 
the quite high total faults the customer experienced outage times denoted by CAIDI are 
on the same level as in the urban cases. The addition of remote controlled disconnectors 
in parallel with FLIR reduces the fault interruption hours of customers and thus lowers 
the customer outage. 
Table 7.9. Results for rural area with FLIR improving fault location by 20 min. 
Faults 
[pcs/a] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [h/a] SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI COC [€/a] 
Case 1 16,67 18 897 5,555 3,837 1,448 439 960
Case 2 16,67 18 631 5,479 3,837 1,428 413 459
Case 3 16,67 6 676 2,108 3,837 0,549 228 943
Case 4 16,67 3 493 1,211 3,837 0,316 173 392
Case 5 16,67 10 437 3,166 2,127 1,488 263 548
Case 6 16,67 7 175 2,248 2,129 1,056 208 381
 
Table 7.10. Results for rural area with FLIR improving fault location by 30 min. 
Faults 
[pcs/a] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [h/a] SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI COC [€/a] 
Case 1 16,67 17 292 5,103 3,837 1,330 412 182
Case 2 16,67 17 043 5,031 3,837 1,311 387 932
Case 3 16,67 6 117 1,951 3,837 0,508 219 284
Case 4 16,67 3 215 1,132 3,837 0,295 168 640
Case 5 16,67 9 556 2,918 2,127 1,372 246 909
Case 6 16,67 6 567 2,077 2,129 0,975 195 950
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The benefits of FLIR are summarized in Tables Table 7.11 and Table 7.12. The major 
difference between rural and urban cases is that in rural area the FLIR has clear impact 
even with lower number of remote controlled switches in cases 1 and 2. Same trend is 
seen with the cases 5 and 6. Overall the improvements are greater in rural network with 
10 to 20 decrease in COC and 15 to 35 percentage decrease in interruption duration 
related indices. 
In addition, the difference between 20 and 30 minute fault location time improvement is 
notable in cases with fewer remote controlled switches. When the controllable feeder 
section are larger the faster fault location time affects more customers and thus has as 
system level effect. As the number of remote controlled sections rise and 
correspondingly their size decreases, the time delay of remote disconnection and 
restoration clearly becomes more important than the time saved in fault location. 
Table 7.11. The benefit of FLIR with 20 min improvement in fault location. 
Faults 
[%] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [%] 
SAIDI 
[%] 
SAIFI 
[%] 
CAIDI 
[%] COC [%] 
Case 1 0,00 14,98 14,46 0,00 14,46 11,62
Case 2 0,00 15,14 14,60 0,00 14,60 11,97
Case 3 0,00 27,67 25,46 0,00 25,46 16,25
Case 4 0,00 40,13 35,28 0,00 35,28 19,02
Case 5 0,00 22,69 21,43 0,00 21,43 11,16
Case 6 0,00 18,02 16,52 0,00 16,52 12,70
 
Table 7.12. The benefit of FLIR with 30 min improvement in fault location. 
Faults 
[%] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [%] 
SAIDI 
[%] 
SAIFI 
[%] 
CAIDI 
[%] COC [%] 
Case 1 0,00 22,20 21,43 0,00 21,43 17,20
Case 2 0,00 22,37 21,58 0,00 21,58 17,41
Case 3 0,00 33,72 31,03 0,00 31,03 19,78
Case 4 0,00 44,89 39,47 0,00 39,47 21,24
Case 5 0,00 29,22 27,59 0,00 27,59 16,77
Case 6 0,00 24,98 22,89 0,00 22,89 17,91
 
The reliability effect of the additional protection zones is summarized in Table 7.13. 
The values have been gained by comparing cases 1 and 5 as well as cases 2 and 6 
without FLIR in use. The results are in line with the results from urban network. The 
COC improvement is approximately 8 percentage higher than in urban area and a 
similar improvement can be seen in other results. 
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Table 7.13. The benefit of circuit breakers without the effect of FLIR. 
Faults 
[%] 
Fault interruption hours 
of customers [%] 
SAIDI 
[%] 
SAIFI 
[%] 
CAIDI 
[%] COC [%] 
Case 5 0,0 39,3 37,9 44,6 -11,9 40,4
Case 6 0,0 60,1 58,0 44,5 24,4 49,2
 
The purpose of the cases 7-15 was to examine the effect of increased weatherproofing 
rate on the reliability improvements gained from network automation. At the center of 
the attention was the customer outage costs, as it affect the viability of the automation 
solution. The results are presented in Figure 7.12. with the effect of remote controlled 
disconnectors and circuit breakers illustrated separately in addition to the total effect.  
 
Figure 7.12.The total customer outage cost results with increased weatherproofing 
rate. 
The COC savings arising from the network structure increase almost linearly from zero 
to 260 k€. as the weatherproofing rate is improved. At the same time the savings gained 
with the automation decreases as expected. With the current network structure the initial 
COC decrease potential of remote controlled disconnectors and circuit breakers is 
actually slightly higher than the final achieved value with the structural changes. The 
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COC improvement declines at first evenly  from 280 k€ to 230 k€ and then falls to 130 
k€ as the weatherproofing rate is boosted from 73 % to 87 %. 
When the effect of disconnectors and circuit breakers are viewed individually,  it can be 
seen that the circuit breakers actually perform better with higher weatherproofing rates 
of 67 % and 73 % where the graph of circuit breakers stays almost constant at 80 k€ and 
the graph of remote controlled disconnectors declines steadily. This is likely due to the 
fact that the cabling was started in the first protection zone and thus the majority of 
customers experienced a major improvement in reliability. When the cabling was 
extended further, the impact of added protection zones decreased as the total fault 
amounts declined. 
 
Figure 7.13. The added COC effect of FLIR as a function of weatherproofing rate. 
The results for the additional reliability effect of FLIR implementation are presented in 
Figure 7.13. Both 20 and 30 min settings for fault location were calculated for cases 
with only remote controlled disconnectors  and cases with both remote controlled 
disconnectors and circuit breakers. The initial COC improvement due to FLIR range 
from 58 k€ to 19 k€. From there all of the curves fall nearly linearly to a range of 25 k€ 
to 10 k€. As illustrated, the benefit gained by implementing FLIR is highest with only 
remote controlled disconnectors in place. With circuit breakers the absolute COC level 
is lower but only minor additional benefit is available with implementation of FLIR. 
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The outage is already limited to a smaller area by circuit breaker in the case of fault in 
the farther protection zone and thus less customers are affected by FLIR. The nearly 
constant diagram for circuit breakers at lower weatherproofing rates is explained by the 
choice of cabled sections, where the beginning of feeder is cabled first and only in the 
last scenario the second half of the feeder is cabled. 
 In general the cases with 30 min FLIR settings show better results than the 
corresponding cases with 20 min settings. However, the difference is reduced as the 
weatherproofing rate is improved. FLIR seems to have smaller absolute impact in 
network with added circuit breakers. Nevertheless, as seen in previous case results, the 
relative impact is equivalent or slightly better. 
7.3 Investment costs 
The investment costs for all of the cases were calculated to set the reliability effects into 
perspective and to enable further economic studies. The RNA-calculations had manual 
disconnectors as a reference but an assumption that they cannot be retrofitted for remote 
control was made. This is a valid assumption as in the case of pad mounted substations 
available space limits the addition of extra components and in the case of pole mounted 
disconnectors it is often practical to change the whole device because of mechanical 
condition or age of the disconnector.  
The costs of RTU and the communication equipment for the substation are included in 
the calculations but the cost of communication network is excluded. 
The unit prices used in the analysis were extracted from Energy Authority's price list for 
2014. The price list represents the average investment cost level of the whole industry. 
It is based on a survey commissioned by Finnish Energy Industries and adjusted by 
Energy Authority. The 2014 price list is presented in Appendix 1. 
The applied unit prices are presented in Table 7.14. As the EA's price list has only price 
for single pole mounted, remote controlled circuit breaker, a price for a switching 
station with two circuit breakers had to be conveyed from other units. This was 
calculated as 
 
Pୖ ୣ୫୭୲ୣ	ୡ୭୬୲୰୭୪୪ୣୢ ୱ୵୧୲ୡ୦୧୬୥ ୱ୲ୟ୲୧୭୬,ଶ ୡ୧୰ୡ୳୧୲ ୠ୰ୣୟ୩ୣ୰
ൌ 	2 ൈ ܲୖ ୣ୫୭୲ୣ ୡ୭୬୲୰୭୪୪ୣୢ ୢ୧ୱୡ୭୬୬ୣୡ୲୭୰ ୱ୲ୟ୲୧୭୬,ଵ ୢ୧ୱୡ୭୬୬ୣୡ୲୭୰ (8.1) 
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Table 7.14. Unit prices for cases 1-6. 
Unit Original EA price [€] Unit price [€] 
Remote controlled disconnector 
station, 1 disconnector 
14020 14020
Remote controlled disconnector 
station, 2 disconnectors 
26100 26100
Remote controlled disconnector 
station, 3-4 disconnectors 
37050 37050
Remote controlled switching station, 
1 circuit breaker including relay 
17170 17170
Remote controlled switching station, 
2 circuit breakers including relay 
- 34340
 
The total amount of automated substations and their types were collected individually 
for the first six cases and the  investment costs were calculated with the unit prices. The 
summarized results are presented in Tables Table 7.15 and Table 7.16. 
 
Table 7.15. The investment costs for urban network. 
 Remote controlled substations Switching stations Total 
Case 1 0 0 0 
Case 2 560 800 0 560 800 
Case 3 895 380 0 895 380 
Case 4 1 282 970 0 1 282 970 
Case 5 0 326 230 326 230 
Case 6 560 800 326 230 887 030 
 
Table 7.16. The investment costs for rural network. 
 Remote controlled substations Switching stations Total 
Case 1 0 0 0 
Case 2 288 600 0 288 600 
Case 3 411 830 0 411 830 
Case 4 608 110 0 608 110 
Case 5 0 154 530 154 530 
Case 6 288 600 154 530 443 130 
 
In the urban area the additional investment cost over manual disconnectors required to 
install remote controlled disconnectors range from 560 k€ to almost 1283 k€. This is 
caused by the complex topology of already cabled network in a densely populated area. 
The amount of disconnectors rises quickly thus increasing the cost level. However, 
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several disconnectors could usually be situated in the same secondary substation to 
lower the share of communication equipment costs. 
The equivalent costs in the rural area are approximately half of those in the urban cases. 
The total number of required disconnectors explains the difference. The rural network 
was much sparsely interconnected and fewer suitable locations for substations are 
available. 
Similar figures can be seen with the circuit breaker cases. The investment costs for the 
urban area are twice the costs of the rural area. As the ratio of circuit breakers per 
switching station is almost the same in both areas, the investment costs are in line with 
the amount of circuit breakers.  
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8. ECONOMICAL STUDY OF CASES 
The economic feasibility of the different cases were studied against the Finnish 
regulatory model described in chapter 3. The aim of these studies was to determine 
whether the investment into increased automation level would be financially justified 
and how the increased communication costs would affect the viability. A reasonable 
case for the analysis was chosen for both environments using a marginal utility 
approach.  
The actual cost of automation system depends on the operational environment, scale and 
geographical characteristics of the distribution network, features and exploitability of 
the existing communications network and network automation in addition to properties 
of SCADA and DMS systems. Depending on the current situation of the DSO, the 
required investment could vary from purchasing of software updates to custom interface 
development to total reconstruction of the communications network. Therefore, the 
objective of this study was to find a break-even point for the communication and IT 
system costs in addition to the actual investment costs for the field equipment. 
8.1 Marginal utility of customer outage cost improvement 
To enable the comparison of cases a marginal utility approach was chosen. The 
efficiency of different solutions was benchmarked with the ratio of the customer outage 
cost improvement to the investment costs of the network components. The 
communication equipment cost for the substations was included but costs at the system 
level, namely the IT system and communication network cost, excluded at this point. 
The marginal utility was calculated separately for both environments with and without 
FLIR. 
The results are presented in Figures Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 for urban and rural 
network area. As expected, the gain in COC savings without FLIR is ten to fifteen times 
greater in rural than urban area due to the base reliability levels. In the urban area each 
invested euro results in a 0,1 € COC saving at best whereas the ratio is 1 to 1,5 in rural 
network. However, this cannot be interpreted as a straight indication of investment 
profitability as the quality incentive constitutes only part of the whole regulation model. 
On the other hand, the differences in current real life situations has to be considered. 
Whereas no remote controlled switchgear has been installed in urban area, the state of 
the rural network corresponds to the case 3. Most of the remote controlled disconnecor 
stations have been built in the 1990s and complemented in the 2000s. 
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Figure 8.1. The marginal utility of customer outage costs for urban area. 
Otherwise the shape of the figures are similar in both areas. The marginal utility rises at 
first in cases 1 to 3 suggesting that the addition of remote controlled disconnectors has a 
positive effect on reliability. For case 4 the marginal utility decreases compared to case 
3. This signifies that the additional increase of disconnectors is less beneficial and the 
peak of cost-efficiency has been reached between cases 3 and 4. 
Cases 5 and 6 show a similar pattern. The addition of circuit breakers in case 5 has the 
highest marginal utility but for case 6 it drops to approximately the same level as in case 
3. For the rural environment the marginal gain in case 5 is somewhat ambiguous. As the 
case includes only circuit breakers and in reality the automation level is already high the 
implementation of case 5 would be closer to case 6. 
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Figure 8.2. The marginal utility of customer outage costs for rural area. 
The addition of FLIR provides further benefits in both areas. In the urban area the curve 
of marginal utility with FLIR follows closely the curve without FLIR. It appears that the 
benefit of FLIR is greatest in case 3. In the rural network the FLIR has the greatest 
effect in cases 2 and 5. This implies that the fault location in rural areas benefits from 
FLIR also with less protection or disconnector zones. In reality, this would be also 
technically more feasible solution, as high short-circuit currents might cause problems 
with relay settings and selectivity on short feeders or short-circuit capacity of the cables 
might set constrains in some areas. It should be noted also, that part of the costs related 
to FLIR are not included in this analysis. 
8.2 Break-even point for communication and IT system costs 
The case 6 was chosen for further economic studies as it represents a feasible method 
for reliability improvement especially in rural area but also in urban area considering 
the marginal utility of customer outage costs. To assess the rationality of the 
calculations, the break-even point for communication and IT system costs in scenario 
with FLIR. 
Calculations were performed using the Finnish regulatory model for the years 2012-
2015. The regulatory WACC for 2014 was chosen for the calculations as it is at 
historically low level. This sets the lower limit for the break-even costs. Additionally, 
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inflation was neglected and an internal WACC of 6,5 % was used to discount the future 
incomes. 
The calculation model accommodates all the primary incentives described in chapter 3. 
The most significant one in this context is the quality incentive. Half of the customer 
outage cost improvement is taken into account through quality incentive and half 
through efficiency incentive. The calculation model assumes four year regulatory 
periods and adjusts the reference level for COC in the first year of each period. 
Therefore the quality incentive has major impact on the results in the first few years of 
calculation. The use of StoNED for efficiency benchmarking is assumed to continue for 
the next regulatory period. The presumed regulatory lifetime of investments was 40 
years including the IT, communication network and field communication equipment. 
The investment was made completely in 2014. The investment costs include project 
costs for installing the network automation equipment as well as communication 
equipment for each substation. The costs were calculated using the current real life 
situation as reference point. An annual rise in operational expenditures was estimated to 
be 400 € per substations which consists of monthly communication costs and 
maintenance visits. 
Table 8.1. The results for break-even point with investment in network components 
included. 
 Investment 
costs (k€) 
Communication network 
and IT costs (k€) 
Total 
costs (k€) 
COC saving, 
FLIR included 
(k€) 
Urban 887,0 -365,6 521,5 49,3 
Rural 154,5 214,1 368,7 65,0 
 
The break-even point for communication and IT systems was defined as the point where 
the investment and other costs are barely covered without generating any profit. The 
regulated asset value of communication network includes a base network component as 
well as an additional value for secondary substations. In this case only the substation 
component was included as the number of base networks does not increase. The results 
are presented  in Table 8.1.  
For the urban network the allowed value is negative, which implies that the scenario is 
unfeasible. While the COC savings are lower than in rural area, the number of 
substations and thus the required investment costs are several times higher. 
In the rural area the COC improvement is relatively higher compared to the investment 
costs. The allowed cost of communication and IT system in the break-even point is 214 
k€. In the worst scenario of outdated communication and operational system, where 
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both DMS and SCADA would need to be replaced in addition whole communication 
system, this would have cover all the costs for a single primary substation. 
Another possible viewpoint into this matter is presented in Table 8.2. If only the 
additional benefit gained from FLIR is considered and the investment in  regulated 
network components is neglected the results are different. The case of urban area is still 
unfeasible. In the rural area the FLIR alone supports ICT costs up to 113 k€. 
Table 8.2. The results for break-even point with only the effect of FLIR considered 
 Investment 
costs (k€) 
Communication network 
and IT costs (k€) 
Total 
costs (k€) 
COC saving, 
FLIR only (k€) 
Urban 0,0 -249,8 -249,8 2,8 
Rural 0,0 112,9 112,9 30,3 
 
Assuming that the rural substation chosen for this study represents an average rural area 
and those areas with medium sized population centers lie somewhere between the urban 
and rural cases both in network structure and thus potential COC savings, the results can 
be generalized. In a situation with 100 substations, of which 10 % are urban type, 40 % 
rural and 50 % in between with no effect on the feasibility, the limit for communication 
and IT renewal costs would be approximately 2 M€ or 20 k€ per substation. 
Whether this would be adequate depends entirely on the DSO and the current systems 
available. For a large DSO with 100 primary substations and return requirement above 
zero the estimated limit would suffice for either communication network renewal and 
minor IT development or IT system renewal. For example, the average price of SCADA 
system including 100 primary substation RTU’s is 1,27 M€ and corresponding 
communication system 630 k€ (Appendix 1). 
8.3 Profitability and sensitivity analysis 
The profitability of the case 6 was assessed using the estimated break-even costs per 
primary substation and the same parameters as in previous chapter. Additionally, the 
sensitivity of these results were calculated with respect to key variables. To gain 
perspective, the assessment was also conducted on cases without FLIR. 
Table 8.3. Profitability calculation results for case 6 without FLIR in use. 
 Investment 
costs (k€) 
Communication 
network and IT 
costs (k€) 
COC savings 
without FLIR 
(k€) 
Payback 
period (a) 
IRR 
(%) 
Net present 
value (k€) 
Urban 887,0 - 46,5 40,0 -0,2 % -402,7
Rural 154,5 - 34,6 4,9 15,9 % 73,1
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Table 8.4. Profitability calculation results for case 6 with FLIR in use. 
 Investment 
costs (k€) 
Communication 
network and IT 
costs (k€) 
COC savings 
without FLIR 
(k€) 
Payback 
period (a) 
IRR 
(%) 
Net present 
value (k€) 
Urban 887,0 20,0 49,3 34,5 0,3 % -385,6
Rural 154,5 20,0 65,0 3,5 32,1 % 194,1
 
The results are presented in Table 8.3 and Table 8.4. Clearly in both cases the addition 
of automation is highly profitable in rural network and unprofitable in more urban 
network. The implementation of FLIR is beneficial in both environments, but it has 
notably greater effect in the rural area. Clearly the addition of automation is a potential 
business case, but the initial reliability level of the network has to be somewhat lower. 
The COC improvement is the supporting factor in these calculations. It has a major 
impact on the cash flow in the first few years after the initial investment. Therefore all 
other simultaneous reliability improving actions diminish the advantage gained in this 
scenario. As demonstrated earlier in Figure 7.13, the current trend of increasing 
weather-proofing rate of the network decreases the potential COC savings. 
 
Figure 8.3. Profitability calculations sensitivity to regulatory WACC changes. 
The sensitivity of the profitability calculation was estimated in relation to the regulatory 
WACC and customer outage cost improvement. Results are presented in Figures Figure 
8.3 and Figure 8.4. Both parameters show a positive linear response. The slope varies 
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according to the parameter and the environment. In the rural area the addition of FLIR 
has also relevance whereas in the urban area the graphs are virtually identical regardless 
of FLIR. 
In general, the calculation model is less sensitive to WACC changes than COC 
variation. This is typical of investment with emphasis on automation because of low 
investment costs compared to the benefits gained. A ten percentage change in WACC 
leads to a two to seven percentage variation in net present value of the investment. The 
significance of customer outage costs in reliability based investment calculation is again 
emphasized by the Figure 8.4. A ten percentage change has a five to over twenty 
percentage effect on the end results. 
 
Figure 8.4. Profitability calculations sensitivity to COC improvement changes. 
Based on these results and two individual examples only indicative conclusions can be 
made. The whole network has to be considered if a partial or whole ICT system renewal 
is contemplated. The network areas chosen for this analysis represent extremities and do 
not provide enough tools for an extensive analysis. Additionally, the exact cost of the 
renewal project is a key factor in such analysis although naturally other important 
drivers that have major impact arise such as operational reliability, security or risks of 
implementation project. It would still seem that the discussed solution has economic 
potential to succeed in some operational environments. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
The focus on this study has been on two reliability related electricity distribution 
network functionalities, which may be considered smart in comparison to the traditional 
network of the past. The development of information technology enables more complex 
and integrated network protection functions that benefit both the customer and the DSO. 
The society has also recognized its dependency on the electricity and the security of 
supply has gained emphasis even on a legislative  level. 
The presented methods included the addition of consecutive protection zones to medium 
voltage distribution network and the introduction of automated fault location, isolation 
and restoration sequences. Both have several alternative operation principles that 
impose more requirements on information and telecommunications system than before. 
The choice of suitable implementation option depends on the current available 
technology as well as longer term strategic choices. For instance, newer relays and 
RTU’s might do with a software update but will the older ones be upgraded in mass 
rollout or at the end of their lifetime. A choice of communication technique for the 
future is a major issue on its own. 
The reliability improvement was established with simulations conducted with Trimble 
NIS and its Reliability based network analysis tool. It was shown that both the increase 
of protection zones and the FLIR have positive effect on widely used reliability indices 
and lower the customer experienced disadvantage denoted by customer outage costs. 
The benefit gained from FLIR has correlation with the level of automation in the 
distribution network but especially in the fault prone rural areas the fault location alone 
improves the reliability level. 
The advantages obtained were much higher in rural environment, where the cabling rate 
is still low in the medium voltage network. Therefore the improvement potential is 
substantially higher than in the already quite secure urban areas. Most of the key points 
of the rural  network are equipped with older disconnector stations and the further 
development of reliability is harder and more expensive.  
The current trend of medium voltage cabling or otherwise lowering the vulnerability to 
weather conditions will reduce the benefits of the introduced functionalities in ten to 
fifteen year timeframe. This was verified separately for the surveyed rural environment. 
In the structurally mixed network the separation of different parts of the feeder as own 
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protection zones could be considered as one alternative for final long-term network 
structure. 
Financially the viability of the implementation depends mostly on the structural state of 
the present distribution network and the features of the current operational IT systems 
and field communication equipment. Especially the FLIR requires real time data 
transmission and controllability of the deployed disconnectors, which is impossible to 
accomplish efficiently with old fashioned polling radio modems. While reliability 
advantages can be achieved also in the densely meshed and mostly cabled network, 
financially the introduction of more advanced protection schemes is only justified in 
rural network. 
On the other hand,  the requirements and specifications of these functionalities can be 
considered when renewing old systems one by one at the end of their lifetime or when 
making choices of future field equipment types. This way the development comes 
naturally and presumably with a lower total cost, but a clear vision of the future target is 
mandatory. 
The estimates presented in this study can be refined with further research. If the actual 
method of execution for the proposed functionalities is chosen, the system requirements 
arising can be specified and a cost estimate may be formed. The analysis of the potential 
reliability benefits is improvable by broadening of the sample areas or by categorizing 
the network areas and finding a representative primary substation for analysis in each 
category. The change in operational expenditures is also an area where a more detailed 
comparison of the maintenance expenses of the old communication network versus the 
available new options is needed. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
NETWORK COMPONENTS AND INDEX ADJUSTED 
UNIT PRICES FOR 2014 
Muuntamot 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
1-pylväsmuuntamo kpl         5 040    
2-pylväsmuuntamo kpl         6 700    
4-pylväsmuuntamo kpl         7 710    
Kevyt puistomuuntamo kpl         9 170    
Puistomuuntamo, ulkoa hoidettava kpl       24 540    
Puistomuuntamo, sisältä hoidettava kpl       33 990    
Kiinteistömuuntamo kpl       53 590    
Erikoismuuntamo kpl       81 140    
Kaapeloitu erotinasema kpl       25 420    
1 kV suojalaitteet kpl         2 040    
Muuntajat 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
16 kVA kpl         3 360    
30 kVA kpl         3 360    
50 kVA kpl         3 430    
100-160 kVA kpl         4 920    
200 kVA kpl         6 450    
300-315 kVA kpl         7 930    
500-630 kVA kpl       10 160    
800 kVA kpl       14 430    
1000 kVA kpl       16 390    
1250 kVA kpl       19 510    
1600 kVA kpl       19 510    
20/10 kV muuntajat kpl     250 990    
10/20 kV muuntajat kpl     254 230    
45/20 kV muuntajat kpl     279 120    
20/20 kV säätömuuntajat kpl     205 550    
20 kV ilmajohdot 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Sparrow tai pienempi km       20 760    
Raven km       24 610    
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Pigeon km       26 570    
Al 132 tai suurempi km       29 930    
Yleiskaapeli 70 tai pienempi km       46 170    
Yleiskaapeli 95 tai suurempi km       48 910    
Päällystetty avojohto 35 - 70 km       30 020    
Päällystetty avojohto 95 tai suurempi km       32 160    
Muut km       20 760    
0,4 kV ilmajohdot 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
AMKA 16 - 25 km       15 480    
AMKA 35 - 50 km       16 710    
AMKA 70 km       19 480    
AMKA 120 km       22 740    
Muut km       15 480    
20 kV erottimet ja katkaisijat 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Johtoerotin, 1-vaiheinen huoltoerotin kpl            320    
Johtoerotin, kevyt kpl         3 530    
Johtoerotin, katkaisukammioin kpl         5 170    
Kauko-ohjattu erotinasema, 1 erotin kpl       14 020    
Kauko-ohjattu erotinasema, 2 erotinta kpl       26 100    
Kauko-ohjattu erotinasema, 3-4 erotinta kpl       37 050    
Pylväskatkaisija, kauko-ohjattava kpl       17 170    
20 kV katkaisija-asema kpl       81 140    
20/20 kV säätöasema kpl     205 550    
20 kV maakaapelit (asennus) 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Enintään 70 maakaapeli km       24 520    
95 - 120 maakaapeli km       32 290    
150 - 185 maakaapeli km       37 940    
240 - 300 maakaapeli km       45 390    
400 - 500 maakaapeli km       84 920    
630 - 800 maakaapeli km     151 030    
Enintään 70 vesistökaapeli km       41 040    
95 - 120 vesistökaapeli km       43 000    
150 - 185 vesistökaapeli km       46 730    
Kojeistopääte kpl         1 260    
Pylväspääte kpl         2 370    
Jatko kpl         2 010    
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0,4 kV maakaapelit (asennus) 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Enintään 25 maakaapeli km         7 840    
35 - 50 maakaapeli km         8 970    
70 maakaapeli km       11 720    
95 - 120 maakaapeli km       12 890    
150 - 185 maakaapeli km       19 850    
240 - 300 maakaapeli km       24 390    
Enintään 35 vesistökaapeli km       11 720    
50 - 70 vesistökaapeli km       14 300    
95 - 120 vesistökaapeli km       21 480    
Vähintään 150 vesistökaapeli km       22 910    
0,4 ja 20 kV maakaapelit (kaivu) 
Yksikkö 
Yksikköhinta 
  euroa/km 
Helppo km       10 120    
Normaali km       23 110    
Vaikea km       66 000    
Erittäin vaikea km     128 240    
Jakokaapit ja jonovarokekytkimet 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Haaroituskaappi kpl            660    
Kaapelijakokaappi, enintään 400 A kpl         1 390    
Kaapelijakokaappi, vähintään 630 A kpl         1 770    
Jonovarokekytkin, enintään 160 A kpl            300    
Jonovarokekytkin, 250 – 400 A kpl            440    
Jonovarokekytkin, 630 A kpl            660    
45, 110 ja 400 kV johdot sekä erotinasemat 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
45 kV puupylväsjohto km       45 440    
110 kV kevytrakenteinen puupylväsjohto km     100 610    
110 kV puupylväsjohto, yksi virtapiiri, yksi 
osajohdin 
km     133 930    
110 kV putkipylväsjohto, yksi virtapiiri, kaksi 
osajohdinta 
km     158 930    
110 kV teräsristikkopylväsjohto, yksi virtapiiri km     228 280    
110 kV teräsristikkopylväsjohto, kaksi virtapiiriä km     291 020    
110 kV maakaapeli, normaali olosuhde, 800 mm² 
tai alle 
km     454 370    
110 kV maakaapeli, vaikea olosuhde, 800 mm² km     530 110    
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tai alle 
110 kV maakaapeli, normaali olosuhde, 1000 
mm² tai yli 
km     751 890    
110 kV maakaapeli, vaikea olosuhde, 1000 mm² 
tai yli 
km     887 120    
400 kV teräspylväsjohto, harustettu  km     195 820    
400 kV teräspylväsjohto, vapaasti seisova km     346 200    
45 kV erotinasema (1 erotin) kpl       20 560    
110 kV johtoerotin kpl       24 880    
110 kV kaukokäyttöinen johtoerotin kpl       36 780    
110 kV johtoaluekorvaus km       22 720    
400 kV johtoaluekorvaus km       31 370    
45 kV sähköasemarakenteet 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
45/20 kV sähköasema kpl     400 290    
45 kV kentät 110 kV asemilla kpl     214 200    
+ lisäkentät kpl     192 570    
Verkkotietojärjestelmä 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Verkkotietojärjestelmä, perusosa kpl     119 010    
+ asiakasmäärään perustuva osa asiakasta             6,5    
Asiakastietojärjestelmä 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Asiakastietojärjestelmä, perusosa kpl       74 640    
+ asiakasmäärään perustuva osa asiakasta             9,4    
Mittaustieto- ja tasehallintajärjestelmä 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Mittaustieto- ja tasehallintajärjestelmä, perusosa kpl     136 310    
+ käyttöpaikkamäärään perustuva osa asiakasta             6,5    
   
Käytönvalvontajärjestelmä 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Käytönvalvontajärjestelmä, perusosa kpl     297 510    
+ sähköasemakohtainen lisäosa kpl         9 740    
+ erotinasemakohtainen lisäosa kpl         2 170    
Käytöntukijärjestelmä Yksikkö  
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Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Käytöntukijärjestelmä, perusosa kpl       21 640    
+ liitettyjen järjestelmien määrään perustuva 
lisäosa 
kpl       21 640    
+ sähköasemakohtainen lisäosa kpl         1 080    
+ erotinasemakohtainen lisäosa kpl            540    
Käytönvalvontajärjestelmän viestiverkot 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Viestiverkot, perusosa kpl       88 720    
+ sähköasemakohtainen lisäosa kpl         5 410    
+ kaapelimuuntamokohtainen lisäosa kpl            760    
   
Energiamittauslaitteet 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
 euroa  
Paikallisesti luettavat mittarit kpl            160    
Etäluettavat mittarit (63 A ja alle) kpl            210    
Etäluettavat mittarit (yli 63 A) kpl            760    
Sähköasematontit 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
  euroa/m2 
Suurkaupunkien kaava-alueet m2           70,4    
Muut kaava-alueet m2             2,7    
Kaavoittamaton alue m2             1,3    
Sähköasemarakennukset 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
   euroa  
Suurkaupunkien kaava-alueet kpl     854 660    
Muut kaava-alueet kpl     243 420    
Kaavoittamaton alue kpl       86 550    
Sähköasemat, 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
110 kV päämuuntajat  euroa  
6 MVA kpl     266 140    
10 MVA kpl     300 750    
16 MVA kpl     346 200    
20 MVA kpl     389 470    
25 MVA kpl     432 750    
31,5 MVA kpl     504 150    
40 MVA kpl     567 970    
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50 MVA kpl     646 950    
63 MVA kpl     768 110    
80 MVA kpl     876 300    
100 MVA kpl     973 670    
220/110 kV muuntaja kpl  1 211 680    
Sähköasemat, 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
110 kV kevyt sähköasema  euroa  
110 kV kevyt sähköasema kpl     394 880    
Sähköasemat 110 kV kentät, 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
ilmaeristeinen sähköasema  euroa  
Muuntajaperustus ja liitynnät ilmaeristeisellä 
asemalla 
kpl       57 340    
Ilmaeristeinen 1-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl     387 310    
+ 1-kisko lisäkenttä kpl     246 660    
Ilmaeristeinen 2-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl     469 520    
+ 2-kisko lisäkenttä kpl     328 890    
Ilmaeristeinen 3-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl     547 420    
+ 3-kisko lisäkenttä kpl     387 310    
Suojaus- ja automaatio, peruskenttä 
(ilmaeristeinen) 
kpl       67 080    
+ lisäkenttä kpl       19 040    
Sähköasemat 110 kV kentät, 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
kaasueristeinen sähköasema  euroa  
Muuntajaperustus ja liitynnät kaasueristeisellä 
asemalla 
kpl       51 930    
Kaasueristeinen 1-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl     601 510    
+ 1-kisko lisäkenttä kpl     361 340    
Kaasueristeinen 2-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl     701 040    
+ 2-kisko lisäkenttä kpl     443 570    
Suojaus- ja automaatio, peruskenttä 
(kaasueristeinen) 
kpl       86 770    
+ lisäkenttä kpl       31 800    
Sähköasemat, 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
20 kV kojeistot  euroa  
Ilmaeristeinen 1-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl       21 420    
+ 1-kisko lisäkenttä kpl       13 960    
Ilmaeristeinen 2-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl       32 780    
+ 2-kisko lisäkenttä kpl       21 960    
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Kaasueristeinen 2-kiskokojeisto, peruskenttä kpl       49 760    
+ 2-kisko lisäkenttä kpl       30 070    
Suojaus- ja automaatio, peruskenttä 
(asemakohtainen) 
kpl       21 420    
+ lisäkenttä kpl         6 380    
Muut verkkokomponentit 
Yksikkö 
 
Yksikköhinta  
   euroa  
Kondensaattori 2,4 Mvar kpl       38 730    
Maasulun sammutuslaitteisto, 100 A kpl     135 240    
Maasulun sammutuslaitteisto, 100 A 
maadoitusmuuntajalla 
kpl     148 210    
Maasulun sammutuslaitteisto, 140 A kpl     157 950    
Maasulun sammutuslaitteisto, 140 A 
maadoitusmuuntajalla 
kpl     176 350    
Maasulun sammutuslaitteisto, 250 A kpl     164 440    
Maasulun sammutuslaitteisto, 250 A 
maadoitusmuuntajalla 
kpl     192 570    
Kuristin, alle 50 MVA kpl       51 930    
Kuristin, yli 50 MVA kpl       70 320    
Varavoimageneraattori, 50-110 kVA kpl       31 370    
Varavoimageneraattori, 250-350 kVA kpl       62 750    
Varavoimageneraattori, 700-1000 kVA kpl     205 550    
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APPENDIX 2 
MEDIUM VOLTAGE OUTAGE STATISTICS FOR SELKÄ AND 
NIITTYKUMPU SUBSTATIONS IN 2009-2012 
 
Table 9.1. The medium voltage outage statistic of Selkä substation in 2009-2012. 
Outage Feeder Duration (h) Energy not 
supplied 
(kWh) 
Power (kW) Customer 
outage cost 
2-
2009Lounais-
1106 
SLKJ07Q0 2,8 1902,43 1586,46 30 603,00 € 
2-
2009Lounais-
1449 
SLKJ02Q0 0,35 877,75 5086,8 22 470,00 € 
2-
2009Lounais-
955 
SLKJ06Q0 
Koski TL 
2,32 883,52 1037,98 10 972,00 € 
2-
2009Lounais-
1050 
SLKJ10Q0 
Mellilä 
1,89 449,61 2163,76 8 847,00 € 
2-
2009Lounais-
1719 
SLKJ10Q0 1,4 25,7 17,51 318,00 € 
2-
2009Lounais-
1991 
SLKJ06Q0 0,3 10,48 49,85 238,00 € 
2-2010-4775 SLKJ05Q0/M
ARTTILA 
2,01 1161,75 3762,25 43 508,00 € 
2-2010-4522 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
4,04 2699,16 1065,76 53 262,00 € 
2-2010-1932 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,19 183 1049,68 3 691,00 € 
2-2010-2024 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,05 36,21 1065,76 1 990,00 € 
2-2010-3035 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,03 19,28 1065,76 1 611,00 € 
2-2010-2116 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,04 3,75 1065,76 1 825,00 € 
2-
2010Lounais-
1199 
SLKJ07Q0 0,43 36,44 132,37 853,00 € 
2-2010-4524 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
4,05 3657,98 1203,74 60 455,00 € 
2-2010-8438 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
4,93 1331,35 2436,61 14 065,00 € 
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2-2010-5411 SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
3,33 199,47 74,26 3 077,00 € 
2-2010-4528 SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
9,95 4038,57 1107,51 68 986,00 € 
2-
2010Lounais-
1545 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
0,2 206,71 1087,6 3 633,00 € 
2-2010-3136 SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
1 82,75 117,82 1 569,00 € 
2-2011-
19922 
SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
1,25 3161,61 5058,82 33 246,00 € 
2-2011-
12634 
SLKJ02Q0 1,1 2954,18 6634,63 95 039,00 € 
2-2011-
21480 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
5,17 3187,3 1087,6 30 752,00 € 
2-2011-2752 SLKJ05Q0/M
ARTTILA 
2,55 2251,21 3596,02 41 766,00 € 
2-2011-2415 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
3,08 2412,76 1218,31 17 561,00 € 
2-2011-9420 SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
5,06 2162,88 1087,6 39 760,00 € 
2-2011-
20248 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
3,91 2026,69 1087,6 21 098,00 € 
2-2011-2768 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
2,7 1798,23 2524,25 25 861,00 € 
2-2011-
10989 
SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
2,07 1029,33 1218,31 15 632,00 € 
2-2011-3247 SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
4,19 477,96 1087,6 6 344,00 € 
2-2011-
11421 
SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
1,24 409,69 1528,93 9 115,00 € 
2-2011-
11373 
SLKJ09Q0/K
AURANEN 
6,45 406,59 755,32 7 196,00 € 
2-2011-8253 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
2,21 364,83 1065,76 6 940,00 € 
2-2011-
11000 
SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
5,34 279,51 143,07 3 275,00 € 
2-2011-
11478 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
10 246,28 221,74 4 822,00 € 
2-2011-
22318 
SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,96 217,51 167,02 2 159,00 € 
2-2011-549 SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
2,51 122,6 37,68 1 201,00 € 
2-2011-8741 SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
0,19 59,71 408,77 1 435,00 € 
2-2011-7548 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,68 68,23 145,51 1 385,00 € 
2-2011-1941 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
4,26 76,33 14,57 774,00 € 
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2-2011-3222 SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
1,02 63,08 54,18 743,00 € 
2-2011-
10034 
SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
1,52 11,59 16,37 323,00 € 
2-2012-
17205 
SLKJ05Q0/M
ARTTILA 
11,83 6865,93 2174,27 143 861,00 € 
2-2012-
15157 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
4,49 1372,46 1087,6 20 748,00 € 
2-2012-
12774 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
2,48 1043,22 1087,6 12 679,00 € 
2-2012-
14683 
SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
5,47 421,81 270,35 5 853,00 € 
2-2012-
14435 
SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
2,07 404,02 270,35 5 206,00 € 
2-2012-
13589 
SLKJ09Q0/K
AURANEN 
0,24 305,78 962,66 4 160,00 € 
2-2012-67 SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
2,08 301,79 107,04 2 950,00 € 
2-2012-
10989 
SLKJ05Q0/M
ARTTILA 
3,55 289,39 53,04 2 440,00 € 
2-2012-
17044 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
0,2 85,89 1087,6 3 867,00 € 
2-2012-227 SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
2,01 167,06 54,18 1 444,00 € 
2-2012-
17229 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
0,03 16,51 1087,6 1 830,00 € 
2-2012-
15865 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
7,36 100,13 22,57 2 123,00 € 
2-2012-48 SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
1,17 90,88 54,18 866,00 € 
2-2012-60 SLKJ09Q0/K
AURANEN 
0,75 45,78 38,31 411,00 € 
2-2012-8225 SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
0,43 38,97 65,89 441,00 € 
2-2012-
14703 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
0,42 29,15 65,89 431,00 € 
2-2012-
12850 
SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,07 10,04 132,6 277,00 € 
2-2012-
14923 
SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
1,72 19,25 6,09 140,00 € 
2-2012-
15515 
SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,19 12,09 74,2 271,00 € 
2-2012-
17326 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
0,4 13,45 58,17 368,00 € 
2-2012-
19678 
SLKJ10Q0/M
ELLILÄ 
1,34 9,36 6,61 120,00 € 
2-2013-6393 SLKJ02Q0 0,71 2106,5 6958,28 40 340,00 € 
2-2013-2501 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
3,43 2506,51 1889,77 29 256,00 € 
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2-2013-3774 SLKJ02Q0 0,5 1625 6353,23 40 803,00 € 
2-2013-3818 SLKJ02Q0 0,3 1188,54 6028,32 29 561,00 € 
2-2013-9226 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
1,03 1418,94 1311,32 15 587,00 € 
2-2013-9136 SLKJ09Q0/K
AURANEN 
4,16 952,8 1468,59 14 520,00 € 
2-2013-4030 SLKJ05Q0/M
ARTTILA 
5,81 895,37 1777,73 71 332,00 € 
2-2013-1519 SLKJ09Q0/K
AURANEN 
3,29 890,59 1813,31 10 273,00 € 
2-2013-5293 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
4,24 652,25 3970,53 14 675,00 € 
2-2013-3753 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
3,12 724,78 1722,86 12 210,00 € 
2-2013-3707 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
4,3 735,59 1338,75 16 767,00 € 
2-2013-5199 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
0,16 312,14 2475,63 7 881,00 € 
2-2013-3550 SLKJ08Q0/S
ORVASTO 
1,77 307,94 373,26 4 714,00 € 
2-2013-7006 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
0,08 48,68 981,78 2 016,00 € 
2-2013-1150 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
0,65 69,07 76,52 747,00 € 
2-2013-3776 SLKJ06Q0/K
OSKI_TL 
1,23 60,19 49,94 861,00 € 
2-2013-3124 SLKJ07Q0/VI
LPPU 
0,15 8,8 153,03 490,00 € 
 
Table 2. The medium voltage outage statistic of Niittykumpu substation in 2009-2012. 
Outage Feeder Duration (h) Energy not 
supplied 
(kWh) 
Power (kW) Customer 
outage cost 
6-2009-537 NTK B24 Q0 1,66 4987,17 2386,27 37 858,00 € 
6-2009-1153 NTK B23 Q0  0,9 1459,74 1526,09 13 958,00 € 
6-2009-567 NTK B24 Q0 0,03 80,2 2604,23 3 959,00 € 
6-2009-939 NTK B12 Q0 2,69 40,89 24,42 822,00 € 
6-2010-1007 
NTK B11 
Q0/NTK B11 1,36 4113,52 17230,76 106 280,00 € 
6-2010-1036 NTK B07 Q0 0,06 406,87 12993,6 25 613,00 € 
6-2010-116 NTK B25 Q0 0,74 545,86 921,65 5 824,00 € 
6-2010-504 
NTK B12 
Q0/NTK B12 1,88 27,36 24,42 584,00 € 
6-2011-4576 
NTK B19 
Q0/NTK B19 0,28 500,42 9739,13 18 135,00 € 
6-2011-1710 NTK B24 1,33 717,47 3216,83 33 312,00 € 
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Q0/NTK B24 
6-2011-1150 
NTK B12 
Q0/NTK B12 3,7 176,61 24,42 1 132,00 € 
6-2012-2546 
NTK B11 
Q0/NTK B11 1,02 2169,29 3886,45 42 659,00 € 
6-2012-17 
NTK B19 
Q0/NTK B19 0,13 767,72 4869,57 14 353,00 € 
6-2012-1968 
NTK B22 
Q0/NTK B22 0,9 428,57 713 6 273,00 € 
6-2012-2403 
NTK B05 
Q0/NTK B05 2,01 12,05 2246,56 3 023,00 € 
6-2012-4060 
NTK B04 
Q0/NTK B04 0,18 16,49 309,25 1 086,00 € 
6-2013-1576 
NTK B19 
Q0/NTK B19 0,19 25,06 121,01 452,00 € 
 
 
 
